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This work is a sociopolitical history focusing on the relationship between political 
rhetoric and white middle class racial anxiety in America from 1958 to 1968. Throughout 
the 1960s, elected officials employed coded language to exploit white America’s racial 
resentments for political gain. As the decade progressed from its early optimism to 
despair, this dialogue recalibrated the American political landscape and significantly 
impacted the nation’s conversation on race. This analysis utilizes existing scholarship as 
well as primary source material to examine this discourse and its place amid the racial 
unrest and social fracture that characterized the 1960s.  
This study closely observes white America’s racial perceptions, outlining the 
critical events that fueled white anxieties, while also avoiding blanket characterizations of 
universal bigotry and racism. Whites in the 1960s understood and interpreted the chaotic 
era and the hard fought racial progress that it produced in varying ways. This progress is 
examined from the standpoint of an often uneasy, white middle class that had grown 
fearful of rising crime rates, urban unrest, and changing social landscapes. Their 
discomfort left many white voters susceptible to racially coded calls for law and order 
from candidates who promised to restore the status quo and return the nation to the 
relative calm of previous eras.   
Though the scope of this work is limited to the 1960s, it speaks to present day 
political concerns in its analysis of the foundational fears and resentments that 
characterize contemporary race relations in the United States. Its primary contribution is 
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to trace the post-war origins of a political dialogue that continues to shape the 
relationship between America’s white middle class and the elected officials they place in 
office. By outlining the distortions and anxieties that divided the nation along racial lines 
in the 1960s, this study challenges readers to be aware of the ways in which 
contemporary office seekers exploit this tension for political gain. In exposing this 
dynamic, the political manipulation of racial trepidation may be lessened and, for those 
who recognize the process chronicled in this study, relegated to the past. 
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On January 20, 2016, Donald Trump delivered an inaugural address that promised 
to return the United States to the people. In the preceding months, his “America First” 
platform and populist pledges to restore the nation to greatness were largely dismissed by 
the media, academic elites, and the political analysts who discounted the brazen real 
estate developer’s chances of victory. However, as election night found state after state 
fading to red, the prospect of a Trump presidency moved from a historical footnote to a 
new American decree. The 2016 election was, in part, a populist referendum on the 
sweeping social and political transformations that have shaped the new millennium. 
Globalization, terrorism, immigration concerns, and racial strife had recalibrated the 
American political landscape in an era characterized by profound change and the assent 
of Barack Obama. 
Speaking at a New York LGBT event in the weeks leading up to the election, 
Trump’s Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton broadly characterized the Republican 
candidate’s supporters as a “basket of deplorables.” Playing to the contempt of the crowd, 
she labeled prospective Trump voters as racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic. Her 
remark exposed a critical social disagreement that had grown increasingly contentious as 
the campaign season wore on. While pundits and national media outlets misread polling 
data, as well as the collective mindset of Middle America, white electoral support for 
Clinton quietly receded as the election approached. Despite the many controversies 
surrounding his qualifications for the presidency, Donald Trump embraced the anxiety 
and resentment of the nation’s white middle class voters. Conversely, Clinton’s 
controversial remark in New York a month earlier indicated that her campaign may have 
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failed to fully register the extent of Middle America’s trepidation concerning changes in 
the nation’s social, political, and economic landscape.1  
Many white voters regarded Clinton as an establishment candidate too far 
removed from the day to day realties of the nation’s working class. Lacking the charisma 
of the two previous Democratic presidents, her platform resonated among historically 
disenfranchised populations like immigrants and minorities, but largely failed to connect 
to the broader white middle class. Globalization and social advancements had left many 
of these voters in the alienated margins of a changing world. In an era increasingly 
characterized by social progress, inclusion, and diversity, many whites felt their tentative 
grasp on middle class prosperity and hegemony slipping away.  
Often left unspoken in the shadows of these fears were deeply rooted racial and 
social resentments that had festered in recent years. For many white voters, the era’s 
changing complexion and progressive momentum appeared to benefit minorities and 
immigrant populations at the expense of traditional white middle class interests. A 
collective sense that too much regard and too many tax dollars were funneling toward 
nonwhites continued to galvanize white communities throughout the Heartland. To many 
among this population, Clinton represented an increase in refugees and immigrants, 
ramped up welfare spending, and higher taxes. These measures were increasingly 
perceived as arriving at the expense of the Middle America. Adding urgency to this 
                                                 
1 White voters preferred Trump over Clinton by 21 percentage points (58% to 37%), according to 
the exit poll conducted by Edison Research for the National Election Pool. Voters without a college degree 
supported Trump 52%-44%. Trump’s margin among whites without a college degree is the largest among 
any candidate in exit polls since 1980. Two-thirds (67%) of non-college educated whites backed Trump, 
compared with just 28% who supported Clinton, resulting in a 39-point advantage for Trump among this 
group. Alec Tyson and Shiva Maniam, "Behind Trump's Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education," 




dynamic were timely terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and Florida, racial unrest 
surrounding police shootings across the nation, and a prevailing sense that the country 
was fragmenting into deeply divided and culturally separate factions. Donald Trump’s 
“America First” platform embraced white middle class apprehensions, channeling them 
into the political capital that would upend the nation’s political arena. 
Trump’s embrace of the racial and social anxieties that shaped the 2016 election 
season was anything but a new phenomenon in twentieth-century postwar politics. His 
campaign drew from a well-established and calculated approach that surfaced long before 
his vow to “Make America Great Again.” The strategy had been forged decades earlier in 
the primary victories of George Wallace, the exodus of the Dixie Democrats during Barry 
Goldwater’s presidential campaign, and the 1968 rebirth of Richard Nixon. The 
“Forgotten Americans” or “Silent Majority” that delivered the White House to Nixon 
returned in the twenty first century to once again remind a divided nation of the political 
potency of an uneasy white middle class. The strategy that reframed the southern political 
landscape in the sixties was reformatted to fit contemporary social and racial anxiety. 
Trump’s election indicates that in the six decades since its inception, the core tenants of 
the Southern Strategy have lost little of their sway over the white working class. Various 
precepts of this doctrine have benefited nearly every successful presidential candidate in 
subsequent decades. Donald Trump’s unprecedented rise to power utilized a well-tested 
and intentional political approach that has been retooled and fortified for over half a 
century.  
The intentional channeling of white middle class social and racial anxiety into 
electoral support remains an essential strategy in modern American politics. This thesis 
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chronicles the 1960s origins of this process and reexamines its impact in the wake of 
Donald Trump’s election. In reassessing the 1960’s sociopolitical landscape, this work 
traces the genesis of an uneasy political current that has traveled across six decades. In 
doing so, this tense energy has time and again adapted to changes in America’s cultural 
climate. With each rebirth, it has gained a new potency and propelled a myriad of 
political and social constructs to the forefront of the American political arena. The pledge 
that adorned Trump’s red campaign hat can now be rightfully placed next to the Southern 
Strategy, The Drug War, Willie Horton’s mug shot, welfare as we know it, and other 
political initiatives that have nodded to the social and racial resentments of America’s 
white middle class. To varying degrees, all of these measures were successful in 
convincing large numbers of white voters to support a return to the status quo. All were 
issued, at least in part, as a response to a liberalism and social change that left many in 
Middle America displaced and uncomfortable with progressive cultural advancements. It 
is within this context that this study will reappraise the social and political topography of 
the 1960s in order to better understand the manipulation of resentments and anxiety that 
placed Donald Trump in the White House in 2016.       
As recent campus protests at U.C. Berkeley continue to intensify and renewed 
racial tensions generate national headlines, echoes of the 1960s reverberate within the 
many social and cultural divisions that fragment contemporary America. The Black Lives 
Matter campaign can trace core tenants of its ethos to the Civil Rights Movement, and the 
unabashed nationalism of the Tea Party recalls the ardent paranoia of the John Birch 
Society. Additionally, Trump’s platform draws many comparisons to those of both 
George Wallace and Richard Nixon, all emerging, in large part, as a reaction to a decade 
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of profound social change and a liberal momentum that challenged the nation’s prevailing 
social norms.  
Recent sideline protests by African American athletes drew direct inspiration 
from the social activism of Muhammad Ali, Tommy Smith, and John Carlos. A new 
sexual revolution surrounding transgender equality also builds upon a 1960s foundation 
with the publication of The Feminine Mystique, the Stonewall Riot, as well as Mattachine 
Society’s advocacy efforts. An accurate understanding of the sociopolitical developments 
that characterized the 1960s is essential for placing Trump’s recent assent within the 
proper contextual framework. This thesis asks readers to consider that many of the 
nation’s contemporary sociopolitical fractures are not unprecedented. Rather, they 
emerge amid the shadows cast by the 1960s. In many critical ways, it feels as if we’ve 
been here before.    
Several pivotal factors provide a foundation for the relationship between racially 
coded political rhetoric and the white middle class racial anxiety profiled in this 
examination of the 1960s. The Great Migration of African Americans from the rural 
South to the industrial North changed the complexion of the nation’s urban landscapes. In 
the postwar era, this exodus coincided with an industrial decline that left many unskilled, 
black laborers without gainful employment. As rising population rates intersected with 
increased levels of adult male unemployment, crime rates began to climb in the 1950s, 
reaching a startling zenith a decade later. Assault, burglary, and rape convictions doubled, 
while robberies nearly tripled as the U.S population grew from 179,323,175 in 1960 to 
201,385,000 by decade’s end.2 African American males represented a disproportionate 
                                                 
2 Christopher Effgen, "United States Crime Rates 1960 - 2015," United States Crime Rates 1960 - 
2015. Accessed March 07, 2017. http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm. 
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percentage of this spike, both as victims and perpetrators of urban crime. As the turbulent 
1960s came to a close, blacks were more than seventeen times as likely to be arrested for 
armed robbery then their white counterparts.3  
This surge in violent crime, combined with the era’s highly televised riots, led 
much of white America to associate urban criminality with African American males. The 
preconception of blacks as dangerous social predators was not a new phenomenon. The 
nation’s long and complex relationship with race and slavery had left a violent and 
uneasy imprint upon white America’s collective consciousness.4 These deeply embedded 
perceptions, coupled with the racial turbulence of the 1960s, provided a new foundation 
for the rise of law and order political rhetoric and the tough on crime posturing that 
centers this study. In his work, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis 
of Liberalism in the 1960, Michael Flamm notes, “For many whites, the appeal of [law 
and order] was undoubtedly a reflection at least in part of racial prejudice and historical 
anxieties. But for most whites the appeal of law and order was due primarily to genuine 
fear, a sentiment shared by many blacks.”5 The manipulation of this fear into political 
capital anchors this examination as it follows the American sociopolitical landscape 
across the 1960s. 
                                                 
3 Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in 
the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), citing, "The Troubled American: A Special 
Report on the White Majority." Newsweek, October 6, 1969, 29-48.  
4 Many works have documented this dynamic. See among others: Martha Hodes, White Women, 
Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth Century South; Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime 
and Punishment in the 19th Century South; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in 
the Old South; Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South; W. Fitzhugh Brundage, 
Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930; Wilber J. Cash, The Mind of the South; Fox 
Butterfield, All God’s Children: The Bosket Family and the American Tradition of Violence. Additionally, 
the 1915 film Birth of a Nation drew upon deeply embedded fears of black males as rapists, exposing an 
archetypical stereotype that extends back to the Reconstruction era.  
5 Flamm, 5. 
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The research in this analysis draws heavily from a number of prominent historians 
who have both directly and indirectly examined the relationship between political 
rhetoric and white middle class racial anxiety in the postwar era. Flamm’s 2005 work is a 
critical study of the rise of law and order political posturing in the 1960s. He traces the 
collapse of liberal momentum through the turbulent decade and examines the relationship 
between rising street crime, civil unrest, and white middle class perceptions of the 
nation’s African American population. Flamm contends that the era’s social upheavals 
fueled the 1968 assent of Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon, as Hubert 
Humphrey was unable to successfully refute claims that the Democratic Party had 
neglected the core interests and concerns of the nation’s white middle class. Additionally, 
Flamm finds that by 1968 many white voters had come to associate Lyndon Johnson’s 
civil rights reforms and Great Society with urban riots and soaring crime rates. These 
perceptions weakened support for the president’s liberal agenda, ended longstanding 
Democratic control of the Oval Office, and paved the way for a conservative backlash 
that would reshape the American political arena in subsequent decades.  
Alan Matusow’s The Unraveling of America follows a similar, though more 
comprehensive trajectory, and stands as a seminal sociopolitical study of the 1960s.6 His 
work also documents the collapse of the nation’s optimism as the liberal ideals of the 
early sixties gave way to the volatile social divisions and unrest that characterized the 
latter part of the decade. First published in 1984, Matusow’s work emerged in an 
America that was reflecting on the lasting implications of the tumultuous 1960s. The 
1980s found Hollywood (Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, The Big Chill), pop music stars like 
                                                 
6 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s. (Athens, 
Ga: University of Georgia Press, 2009). 
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Bruce Springsteen (Born in the USA), and vocal veterans like Ron Kovic (Born on the 
Fourth of July) attempting to process the lasting implications of the 1960s. The 
Unraveling of America surfaced amid this collective national reflection and remains a 
critical and exhaustive account of the era.  
Matusow explores the disintegration of traditional American values and postwar 
consensus as the optimism born in the wake of Kennedy’s election gave way to social 
fracture and desperation. As Martin Luther King, the Kennedys, and the Great Society 
fell to the era’s darker impulses, the promise they embodied was replaced by despair and 
unrest as the decade came to a contentious close. Like Flamm, Matusow traces the 
torrents of white middle class disaffection that delivered the presidency to law and order 
candidate Richard Nixon. Both authors chronicle the decade’s escalating turmoil and pay 
close attention to the perceptions and anxiety of white voters. In doing so, Flamm and 
Matusow masterfully outline the 1960’s chaotic arc and provide a critical foundation for 
the analysis found in this study. 
Historian Dan T. Carter examines the manipulation of white racial trepidation in 
1995’s The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism and 
the Transformation of American Politics.7 With the infamous Alabama governor at the 
work’s center, Carter outlines the channeling of white racial resentments into electoral 
support throughout the 1960s. Wallace’s zealous provocations and racially coded 
language abandoned direct calls of “nigger nigger” for proclamations of states’ rights, 
private property protections, and community control of neighborhoods and schools. As he 
championed the gospel of racial separation, Wallace’s message found resonance 
                                                 
7 Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and 
the Transformation of American Politics. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013). 
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throughout the nation, traveling far beyond the segregated South. Carter’s work examines 
the means by which Wallace exposed the racial hostilities and resentments of northern 
whites who were increasingly disenchanted with integration, the Civil Rights Movement, 
rising crime, as well as President Johnson’s liberal initiatives. In doing so, Wallace 
provided a critical bedrock for the conservative groundswell that placed Ronald Reagan 
in the Oval Office and reshaped the twentieth century political landscape.  
Michael Schaller and George Rising’s 2001 The Republican Ascendancy places a 
similar emphasis on tracking the origins of 1960s conservative backlash, examining the 
expansion of the Southern Strategy that drew white voters away from the Democratic 
Party.8 The authors outline the social, political, and cultural changes that transformed 
America in the 1960s and explore how these shifts made Republican candidates like 
Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and Ronald Reagan attractive to white middle class 
voters. Schaller and Rising find that G.O.P candidates became increasingly adept at 
channeling the discord of the 1960s into political support by amplifying conservative 
positions on racial and cultural issues, as well as embracing a staunch law and order 
platform. 
In recent years, emerging scholarship has examined white middle class racial 
perceptions in an era characterized by the assent of America’s first black president. 
Scholars such as Michelle Alexander and Ian Haney Lopez refute the notion of a “post-
racial” America, find considerable fault in Barack Obama’s tepid response to race-based 
issues, and closely observe the white backlash that has followed the election of the forty-
fourth president. Alexander’s seminal 2010 work The New Jim Crow: Mass 
                                                 
8 Michael Schaller and George Rising, The Republican Ascendancy: American Politics, 1968-
2001. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2002).  
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Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness asks readers to consider the ways in which 
policy makers have channeled white America’s racial fears and trepidation into support 
for the mass incarceration of the nation’s black and brown populations.9 She contends 
that this dynamic, not unlike the Jim Crow laws of old, has created a new racial under 
caste in which minority populations are denied access to full citizenship rights. In 
documenting this process, Alexander, like Flamm and Matusow, closely examines the 
ways in which the perceptions of the nation’s white middle class are instrumental in 
shaping public policy. Her work traces the intentional manipulation of racial trepidation 
and resentment through the twentieth century and demonstrates how this process was 
used to garnish support for office seekers at all levels of government.  
 Much like Alexander’s work, Ian Haney Lopez’s 2014 Dog Whistle Politics: 
How Coded Racial Appeals have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class 
emerges in an America actively processing the presidency of Barack Obama.10 Lopez 
asks readers to consider that for over five decades, elected officials have used carefully 
coded language to channel racial anxiety into success at the ballot box. In doing so, office 
seekers have manipulated racial fear, persuading white voters to support policies that 
increase wealth inequality while eroding support for public schools, unions, and other 
institutions that broadly benefit the middle class. Lopez posits that the white middle class 
has been deceived into supporting measures that undermine their best interests. He 
contends that this vulnerable population often becomes overtaken with fears of Sharia 
law infiltrating the heartland, illegal immigration, and welfare fraud. As a result, political 
                                                 
9 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. (New 
York: New Press, 2010). 
10 Ian Haney-Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism 
and Wrecked the Middle Class. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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actors manipulate these racially charged apprehensions, convincing white voters to 
unwittingly support conservative directives that hinder the economic and social progress 
of Middle America. At the center of Lopez’s analysis is the role of racial fear in guiding 
the perceptions and actions of the white middle class. In this way his work, along with 
Alexander’s, provides a contemporary analysis and updated insight to the key tropes that 
guide this study.  
In addition to the works cited above, this examination draws many of its findings 
from primary source material including polling data, population demographics, crime 
statistics, and pertinent periodicals from the era. These resources are instrumental in 
gauging the public sentiment that shaped the perceptions of the white middle class voters 
profiled in this study. Additionally, this analysis closely examines the language used by 
political actors in the 1960s. Because so much of this work’s focus concerns the dialogue 
between white voters and the era’s elected officials, a critical examination of their public 
addresses and correspondence necessarily centers this thesis. These resources allow us to 
analyze the impact of racially coded appeals on the white middle class. By paying close 
attention to the rhetoric used by politicians in the 1960s, readers are able to unravel the 
means by which this language spoke to the fears and resentments of white voters in an era 
characterized by unprecedented unrest and social change.   
The term “white middle class” is used at great length throughout this work. In 
defining this phrase I echo Ian Haney Lopez’s designation. In Dog Whistle Politics, he 
defines “whites” as “voters who respond to appeals directed at their sense of themselves 
as white persons.”11 While this characterization refers to whites in the aggregate, it does 
                                                 
11 Lopez, 11. 
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not intend to ignore the complicated and varied ways in which white Americans view 
their racial or ethnic identity. However, in this study the term is necessarily used broadly 
in order to chronicle the voters who anchor this analysis. 
Similarly, the term “middle class” derives its meaning from the New Deal 
conception of “persons in the broad economic middle as well as those near poverty 
struggling to gain economic security.”12 Important distinctions exist between the nation’s 
“working” and “middle” classes. However, this analysis often places both populations 
together as a means of distinguishing them from both the nation’s affluent, as well as its 
impoverished citizens. Throughout this work’s examination of the 1960s, references to 
“collapsing liberalism” are also taken from New Deal precepts. New Deal doctrine 
viewed the federal government as having four essential responsibilities in safeguarding 
the nation from the depredations of the Great Depression. This perspective held that the 
federal government should protect against unforeseen hardships such as sickness and job 
loss that economically devastate vulnerable middle class workers. Secondly, this 
approach acknowledged the need for protections of quality schooling, higher education, 
and mortgage assistance in order to promote upward social mobility. Additionally, the 
New Deal fostered infrastructure advancements that facilitated economic prosperity while 
utilizing federal regulations in order to monitor marketplace abuses. Finally, this 
liberalism also called for a progressive system of taxation that worked to prevent 
excessive concentrations of wealth. 
 Understanding this conceptualization of “liberal government” is critical in 
assessing this work’s overview of the Johnson administration, as well as the ways in 
                                                 
12 Lopez, 5-6. 
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which Goldwater, Reagan, and Nixon began to move the United States toward modern 
conservatism in the 1960s. As Republican office seekers increasingly convinced middle 
class whites of liberal government dangers, these elected officials ushered in a new 
conservatism that moved the nation’s political center irreversibly to the right. The impact 
of racial perceptions in shifting the American political landscape underscores much of 
this analysis.    
The chapters that follow examine the critical transformations of the 1960s and the 
impact of these changes on the perceptions of the nation’s white middle class. In doing 
so, this work knowingly omits several important facets of the era. This study excludes, to 
a large degree, the direct impact of the decade’s political rhetoric and subsequent 
elections on the country’s African American population. Similarly, the myriad of 
responses leveled by blacks to the changes that shaped the decade are left unexamined. 
The absence of these stories from this analysis does not indicate a disregard for their 
relevance in understanding the 1960s. Rather, the confines of this work leave these issues 
for future examination.  
Additionally, much of this study’s examination of race centers on the nation’s 
black-white dynamic to the exclusion of other minority groups and traditionally 
marginalized populations including Latinos, women, and homosexuals. The many ways 
in which the advocacy efforts of these populations impacted the perceptions of America’s 
white middle class have been outlined at great length by a number of scholars including 
Ernesto Chavez, Heather White, and Sara Evans. Therefore, readers are encouraged to 
examine these respective works to explore these social evolutions in greater detail. 
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Finally, this research explores the 1960s political actors who worked to channel 
the racial fears and resentments of America’s white middle class from the presidential 
campaigns that shaped the era’s political landscape. With the exception of California 
(1966) and Alabama (1962), it largely ignores the state and local political arenas that 
greatly impacted the nation’s perceptions and political reactions. Critical racially charged 
issues of the decade, including school and neighborhood integration as well as mayoral 
and city council elections, played out in local arenas throughout the country. 
Examinations of these local races and their impact on white voters are too numerous to be 
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This chapter outlines the growth and manipulation of white middle class racial 
anxiety from George Wallace’s 1962 rise to prominence to Ronald Reagan’s successful 
bid for the California governorship in late 1966. Rising crime rates, racial unrest, and 
cold war anxieties impacted how white America perceived the nation’s African American 
communities, the Civil Rights Movement, as well as President Lyndon Johnson’s liberal 
reforms. This critical period helped galvanize the nation’s racial and political divides, 
setting in place a cultural line of demarcation that continues to inform American race 
relations in the twenty first century. 
This chapter also examines how the 1964 Presidential election found both Barry 
Goldwater and George Wallace offering the white middle class racially coded solutions 
to the era’s mounting social and political turmoil. Along the campaign trail, each linked 
the President’s liberal agenda to rising crime, racial unrest, and what they portrayed as 
the country’s broader moral decline. In doing so, both candidates embraced an 
unrelenting return to law and order. By 1968, this issue would center the nation’s political 
discourse and emerge as the primary concern confronting voters. While neither candidate 
would capture the Oval Office in 1964, they set in place a foundation for the highly-
racialized Southern Strategy that would soon help carry Richard Nixon to the White 
House. In analyzing the language used by both Goldwater and Wallace, chapter one 
explores the postwar origins of directing racially coded appeals at middle-class whites. 
The decade’s racial turmoil made this an essential approach for capturing white support 
at the ballot box and has since remained an indispensable strategy for subsequent office 
seekers at all levels of government.   
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Chapter one also examines how 1965’s Watts riot, rising crime rates, as well as 
the Moynihan Report, impacted how middle class whites understood the nation’s African 
American population. These events eroded support for both President Johnson’s Great 
Society, as well as the Civil Rights Movement. Utilizing extensive polling data as well as 
periodicals from the era, chapter one explores how the white middle class’ tenuous 
support for racial progress had begun to recede as Reagan initiated his bid for the 
Governor’s mansion in early 1966. His language along the campaign trail reflected a 
willingness to target the mounting social and racial resentments of the nation’s white 
middle class. By the fall of 1966, these resentments and anxieties had begun to 
irreversibly shape the nation’s political landscape, setting the stage for a broader white 
backlash that would soon recalibrate the American political arena. 
Wallace 
Assessing his defeat in Alabama’s 1958 gubernatorial election, George Wallace 
famously vowed to never again be “outniggered” by a political opponent. Wallace’s 
turnabout stands as a critical genesis point for the coupling of racially coded political 
rhetoric and white middle class racial anxiety in the United States. After being defeated 
by the state’s Attorney General John Patterson and his staunch segregationist platform, 
Wallace observed that the most direct route to the governor’s mansion was to appeal to 
the racial resentments of the state’s white voters. In his subsequent 1962 gubernatorial 
campaign, the former Golden Gloves champion revised his strategy and deliberately 
harnessed the mounting racial animosities of whites in Alabama by zealously denouncing 
integration and federal authority.13 Along the campaign trail Wallace vehemently 
                                                 
13 Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: The Origins of the New Conservatism and the 
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opposed the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education ruling, while embracing a platform of 
southern nationalism and states’ rights.  
By 1962, over thirty percent of Alabama’s three and a half million residents were 
black, which was a far higher percentage than the national average that had hovered at 
around ten percent since the 1940s.14 The significant number of African Americans living 
among the white population rendered Alabama a contentious breeding ground for the 
civil-rights related unrest, which, by mid-century, had begun to impact race relations 
within the region. Much of Wallace’s support in the 1962 gubernatorial election, as well 
as his eventual rise to national prominence, stemmed from a white backlash against civil 
rights efforts within his home state. Campaigns led by Martin Luther King’s Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
targeted Alabama, making it a critical epicenter for the nation’s broader civil rights 
struggle.15 
By the 1962 gubernatorial election, whites in Alabama had nervously witnessed 
the escalation of racial tension and civil rights related unrest. Many whites in the state 
regarded 1955’s bus boycott with trepidation and resentment as it disrupted the city’s 
public transportation system for 381 days in the wake of Rosa Park’s arrest in December 
of that year. Inspired by the lunch counter sit-ins in Greensboro, over a thousand black 
students from Alabama State College participated in protests at the Montgomery county 
courthouse on February 25, 1960.16 A year later, freedom riders protesting interstate 
                                                 
Transformation of American Politics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 96. 
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segregation policy in the South made three stops in Alabama that resulted in violence as 
angry white mobs set fire to a bus near Anniston and attacked passengers with chains and 
pipes in Birmingham.17 These disruptions to the state’s racial status quo garnished 
national headlines and set the stage for Wallace’s campaign. By the fall of 1962, the 
candidate’s zealous, hardline rhetoric resonated with the state’s white voters, many of 
whom had come to view recent civil rights activity as an affront to white hegemony and 
racial norms that had characterized the region for decades.18    
By handily winning the 1962 gubernatorial election with ninety-seven percent of 
the popular vote, Wallace successfully channeled racial tensions among Alabama whites 
into political victory. However, his approach was not necessarily rooted in a long-
standing, racial vitriol. Addressing black voters in 1958 he reasoned, “If I didn’t have 
what it took to treat a man fair, regardless of his color, then I don’t have what it takes to 
be the governor of your great state."19 Instead, Wallace’s appeal to the anxieties and 
resentments of whites in Alabama emerged from a relentless desire for office. Provoking 
the racial animus of southern whites simply provided Wallace with the most direct route 
to the governor’s mansion in Montgomery. The highly racialized turnabout was born out 
of political expediency. This methodology would, in time, help deliver the South to the 
Republican Party and reframe the American political landscape.20 
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Shortly after his election victory, in January 1963, Wallace delivered his infamous 
“Segregation Now, Segregation Tomorrow, and Segregation Forever” inaugural address 
in Montgomery, Alabama. The speech articulated a hardline, anti-integrationist stance 
that invigorated his base and established his persona as America’s foremost champion of 
segregation. Wallace’s subsequent gubernatorial and presidential campaigns would 
extend these themes and prod the nation’s racial anxieties and resentments. Reflecting on 
the potency of this approach, Wallace later recounted, "You know, I tried to talk about 
good roads and good schools and all these things that have been part of my career, and 
nobody listened. And then I began talking about niggers, and they stomped the floor.”21 
Wallace’s first year as governor of Alabama found the state embroiled in 
nationally-publicized, civil-rights related unrest and violence. In early May, nearly a 
thousand African Americans, many of them minors, were arrested in Birmingham after 
the city’s Public Safety Commissioner, Bull Connor, savaged protestors with fire hoses 
and snarling dogs. The startling imagery of peaceful demonstrators being attacked by law 
enforcement was captured on film and broadcast throughout the nation. Just nine days 
after the nationally publicized confrontation with Connor, bombs exploded near the 
SCLC’s Birmingham headquarters and in front of the home of Martin Luther King’s 
brother. A riot followed wherein an estimated 2,500 of the city’s black residents 
“attacked police and firemen, wrecked scores of police and private automobiles and 
burned six small stores and a two-story apartment house.”22 On May 12, President 
Kennedy, responding to national outrage over Connor’s highly publicized handling of the 
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demonstrators, readied, but did not deploy federal troops near Birmingham in order to 
quell further unrest.23  
Throughout the fall of 1963, white supremacists in Alabama detonated explosives 
near the homes of black civil rights activists. On the morning of September 15, a bomb 
exploded on the steps of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church killing four children. In a 
letter he wrote to Wallace following the bombing, Martin Luther King declared that the 
Alabama governor had “the blood of our little children on [his] hands.”24 The events in 
Alabama elevated the states’ protracted civil rights struggle, as well as its governor, to the 
forefront of the nation’s contentious conversation on race.  
The 1963 court-ordered desegregation of the University of Alabama provided 
Wallace with a new platform from which to stir the mounting racial backlash among his 
southern constituency and increase his profile among white northerners. As he blocked 
the entrance to the college in Tuscaloosa, Wallace again made national headlines. With 
federal troops standing by and television news networks broadcasting the event, many 
whites across the nation, nervous about the impact of civil rights progress, found 
themselves relating to Wallace and his message of racial separation. A 1963 Gallup poll 
found that seventy-eight percent of the nation’s white population would relocate if their 
neighborhoods became integrated. Sixty percent expressed an unfavorable view of Martin 
Luther King’s March on Washington, stating that it was ineffective and would likely lead 
to violence.25 To many middle-class whites throughout the nation who had grown 
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increasingly nervous about changes to the nation’s racial status quo, Wallace appeared 
composed and reasonable as he, like many of them, opposed integration and the collapse 
of America’s racial order. 
Wallace’s heightened national profile increased his awareness of the degree to 
which, by mid-decade, racial tension and civil rights related concern had grown in the 
North as well as the South. A Harris survey poll from August 1964 found that nearly half 
of middle-class whites voiced uncertainty about civil rights progress, while almost a third 
directly opposed it. A subsequent poll the following year found that much of the nation’s 
white population had grown increasingly suspicious of the Civil Rights movement. A 
plurality of those surveyed believed that civil rights organizations had been, “infiltrated 
by communists, with almost a fifth of the country unsure as to whether or not [the 
movement] had been compromised.”26   
The Alabama governor would soon channel these apprehensions and find new 
support from middle-class whites in the North who had grown alienated by the decade’s 
social unrest and racial turmoil. Describing the heightened racial anxieties that had 
become evident in the North by 1964, NBC’s Douglas Kiker imagined Wallace’s 
realization that racial appeals could be employed above the Mason Dixon line 
proclaiming, “He looked out upon those whites north of Alabama and was suddenly 
awakened by a blinding vision: They all hate black people, all of them. They are afraid, 
all of them. Great God! That's it! They're all Southern. The whole United States is 




Southern."27 Wallace’s revelation would fuel the Alabama governor’s bid for the 
Democratic Party’s 1964 presidential nomination. 
In the spring of 1964, Wallace landed in Madison, Wisconsin, and began 
captivating blue-collar audiences with racially coded warnings that would earn him over 
a third of the state’s primary votes. He stirred the mounting racial resentments of the 
state’s Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian communities with dire warnings 
regarding the Civil Rights Movement’s harmful impact on union seniority practices, links 
to communism, and the dangers of open housing measures. The 1964 Civil Rights Bill, 
he said, would make it impossible “for a homeowner to sell his home to whomever he 
chose,” and “would plunge community schools into chaos.”28 
Wallace’s success in Wisconsin made national headlines and proved to the 
governor that his revelation regarding the racial resentments of white northerners was 
correct. Wallace campaigned in Indiana, channeling similar sentiments, winning thirty 
percent of the primary vote in the Hoosier state. According to a newspaper reporter in 
Maryland, where Wallace carried sixteen of twenty-three counties, voters “went to the 
polls with big grins on their faces to show Uncle Sam that they had had it.” One 
Maryland voter told a stunned reporter in May that Wallace was, “not the bad man they 
keep reading and hearing about. What he says makes a lot of sense down here.”29  
In the weeks following Wallace’s strong showing in the Maryland primary, 
President Lyndon Johnson declared from the East Room of the White House, “We 
believe that all men are created equal. Yet many are denied equal treatment...it cannot 
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continue.” “Morality,” said the President, “forbids it. And the law I sign tonight forbids 
it.”30 On July 2, in front of more than one hundred and fifty legislators, civil rights 
activists, and justice department officials, Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the nation’s most extensive civil rights measure since Reconstruction. The sweeping 
legislation, which ended segregation in public spaces and banned employment based 
discrimination, provided the Alabama governor with a new platform from which to 
oppose Johnson’s bid for reelection.  
Two days after the bill was signed, Wallace warned an Atlanta audience “that the 
President of the United States has just signed into law the most monstrous piece of 
legislation ever enacted… a fraud, a sham and a hoax! This bill,” he said, “will live in 
infamy.”31 Wallace also preyed upon perceptions of a communist link to the Civil Rights 
Movement telling the white middle class audience, “I do not call the members of the 
United States Supreme Court communists, but I do submit for your judgment the fact that 
every single decision of the Court in the past ten years…has been decided against 
freedom and in favor of tyranny.”32 The “liberal left-wingers have passed it [the Civil 
Rights Act]. Now,” said Wallace, “Let them employ some ‘pinknik’ social engineers in 
Washington to figure out what to do with it.”33 The crowd cheered and chanted “George! 
George! George!” as the Alabama governor exited the stage.  
Alabama Journal reporter Wayne Greenshaw, shocked at the success of 
Wallace’s racially charged performance, recalled that the governor had “never uttered the 
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word ‘nigger,’” but had strongly conveyed his messages with code phrases like “the boot 
of tyranny,” “the power to dictate,” and “the framework of our priceless freedoms.” 
Wallace, said the reporter, had “cried out” for the white middle class’ collapsing social 
order. A former Alabama senator and contemporary of Wallace later recalled the 
governor’s use of coded language to exploit racial resentments and appeal to white 
audiences. "He can use all the other issues-law and order, running your own schools, 
protecting private property rights-and never mention race. But people will know he's 
telling them a nigger's trying to get your job, trying to move into your neighborhood. 
What Wallace is doing is talking to them in a kind of shorthand, a kind of code."34  
As the summer of 1964 wore on, the Democratic Party increased its support for 
Johnson’s reelection bid. These efforts, coupled with a decline in Wallace’s national 
support, (a Gallup poll in July showed the candidate slipping to only three percent outside 
of the South) led to his July 19 withdrawal from the Democratic primary race. The white 
backlash that had fueled the Alabama governor’s brief assent to the forefront of the 
national political landscape was not enough to realistically allow him to unseat the 
President for the Democratic nomination. His rhetoric and broad association with racial 
bigotry was a hindrance to his campaign outside of the South. Wallace, however, 
declared his run for the Presidency a success, as he carried his ardent message to the end 
of the campaign trail announcing, “Today we hear more states’ rights talk than we have 
heard in the last quarter-century. I was the instrument through which this message was 
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sent to the high councils of both major political parties. My mission,” said Wallace, “has 
been accomplished.”35  
In the waning days of Wallace’s 1964 primary run, the Alabama governor was 
forced to concede defeat. After flirting with the notion of a third party run at the 
presidency, Wallace contacted a Republican delegate with ties to Arizona Senator Barry 
Goldwater, offering to join his campaign as vice president. Wallace advisor, Seymour 
Trammell, recalls the Alabama governor’s impassioned plea for a spot on the G.O.P 
ticket. “With all my big victories of the last two years, it must be apparent to a one-eyed 
nigguh who can’t see good outa his other eye, that me and Goldwater would be a winning 
ticket. We’d have the South locked up, then him and me could concentrate on the 
industrial states of the North and win.”36 Goldwater declined the offer and made a 
conscious effort throughout his own presidential campaign to avoid being linked to 
Wallace, carefully distancing himself from the charges of racial extremism that had 
limited the success of the Alabama governor. While Goldwater lacked Wallace’s racially 
zealous, populist provocations, the mild-mannered Republican candidate for president 
carefully coded his own campaign rhetoric around the nation’s mounting racial 
resentments as the Presidential election of 1964 approached.  
Goldwater 
Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, along with the rest of the nation, watched as 
the country continued to fracture along racial and social lines as it approached the 
decade’s halfway mark. Against a backdrop of Cold War anxiety and mounting racial 
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tension, the contentious divisions that would soon burn white hot had, by the 1964 
election season, only just begun to intensify. The emergent white backlash against the 
Civil Rights Movement and shifting racial and cultural norms had steadily gained 
momentum for nearly a decade and had grown increasingly evident as Goldwater became 
the presumptive candidate for the Republican Party in the summer of 1964.  
Racial anxieties and mounting social divisions continued to grow throughout the 
early 1960s along with the nation’s crime rates. Violent crime had risen from 288,460 
reported instances in 1960 to 364,220 only four years later and continued to rise in all 
categories including robbery, rape, and murder.37 U.S. News and World Report from June 
29, 1964 announced that the country was experiencing a "crime wave of unprecedented 
proportions" and linked much of the blame to street demonstrations and leadership within 
the Civil Rights Movement.38 A Gallup poll taken in August showed the white middle 
class evenly divided between those who identified as sympathetic to the civil rights cause 
and those who had begun to identify it with violent provocations, communism, and rising 
crime rates.39 Three months later, a report issued by the FBI claimed that the 1964 
summer youth riots in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Jersey City “demonstrated 
an increasing collapse in respect for the law and the rights of others.”40 The uprisings, 
which came in response to decades of police brutality within black areas of the cities, 
captured national headlines and pushed the issue of law and order to the forefront of the 
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nation’s political discourse.41 Newsweek, looking ahead to the November election, 
profiled the nation’s mounting concern over “safety in the streets,” noting that the issue's 
real "potency could be its close association with civil rights in the minds of many 
voters.”42 
Promoting a law and order platform of limited government, states’ rights, and a 
strict adherence to the Constitution, Barry Goldwater won the Republican Party’s 
presidential nomination on July 16, 1964. From a podium at the Republican National 
Convention in San Francisco, Goldwater addressed the recent rise in crime and civil 
rights related unrest that had made white America increasingly uneasy. The Arizona 
Senator covertly linked social protest to crime, assuring the audience of his commitment 
to law and order while never explicitly mentioning race or the Civil Rights Movement. 
[T]his party, with its every action, every word, every breath, and every heartbeat, 
has but a single resolve, and that is freedom - freedom made orderly for this 
nation by our constitutional government; freedom under a government limited by 
laws of nature and of nature's God; freedom - balanced so that liberty lacking 
order will not become the slavery of the prison cell; balanced so that liberty 
lacking order will not become the license of the mob and of the jungle. Security 
from domestic violence, no less than from foreign aggression, is the most 
elementary and fundamental purpose of any government, and a government that 
cannot fulfill that purpose is one that cannot long command the loyalty of its 
citizens. History shows us - demonstrates that nothing - nothing prepares the way 
for tyranny more than the failure of public officials to keep the streets from bullies 
and marauders.43     
                              
Throughout his campaign, the Republican candidate would cast the President as a 
liberal promoter of policies that facilitated racial unrest, delinquency, and the 
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squandering of tax revenue on undeserving welfare recipients. Along the campaign trail 
in the summer and fall of 1964, Goldwater denounced the Johnson administration for 
tolerating civil disobedience in order to win the black vote. With the debate over civil 
rights legislation looming on the nation’s periphery, the Arizona conservative declared, 
"Many of our citizens-citizens of all races-accept as normal the use of riots, 
demonstrations, boycotts, violence, pressures, civil disorder, and disobedience as an 
approach to serious national problems.”44 Goldwater drew a contrast between his 
embrace of law and order and the president’s tolerance of chaos and unrest declaring in 
the fall of 1964, “choose the way of the Johnson administration and you have chosen the 
way of mobs in the street."45  
  In his 1964 campaign brochure, Goldwater carefully measured his opposition to 
civil rights legislation claiming, “Unenforceable government edicts benefit no one. 
Continued public attention and moral persuasion, I believe, will do more, in the long run 
to create the good will necessary to the acceptance of decent racial relations in all 
segments of our society.”46 The pamphlet, entitled BARRY GOLDWATER SPEAKS OUT 
FOR A STRONGER AMERICA, directly condemned civil disobedience. “Our people,” it 
read “must not be herded into the streets for the redress of their grievances. We have 
better ways, more lasting and more honest ways.”47  
 Goldwater ignored claims that the civil rights movement often employed civil 
disobedience as its last and only means to secure reform after repeated requests, petitions, 
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and peaceful demonstrations had proved ineffective. He also failed to address the 
underlying economic disadvantages facing poor black communities as a possible root 
cause of rising crime rates. Disregarding the structural racism and deeply imbedded 
injustices that fueled civil disobedience, he presented a simple choice to voters–law and 
order or crime in the streets. Despite being a proponent of limited government (he 
opposed Johnson’s civil rights legislation beneath the banner of states’ rights and 
constitutional overreach), Goldwater championed a law and order solution to recent 
unrest and rising crime rates by imploring the federal government to get tough on 
criminals.  
Goldwater’s platform supported an implied, racially-coded matrix that divided the 
country between “us” (white, non-criminal, taxpayers) and “them” (black, criminal, 
welfare recipients). In establishing this paradigm, Goldwater worked to invigorate his 
national base and lure disenfranchised southern Democrats to the G.O.P. With his 
embrace of a racially coded, law and order platform, the Republican hopeful worked to 
reframe the election as an ideological battle between Johnson, a liberal who supported the 
Warren Court’s protection of criminals, and himself, a staunch conservative who 
championed limited government and traditional social values. 
Throughout the campaign, Goldwater vigorously cast Johnson’s domestic policy 
as a failure of big government that promoted the collapse of societal order and public 
safety. On March 4, 1964, he warned a New Hampshire audience, "Government seeks to 
be a parent, teacher, leader, doctor, and even minister. And its failures are strewn about 
us in the rubble of rising crime rates."48 The Arizona senator later extended this theme by 
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drawing comparisons between social safety nets like welfare, which were increasingly 
associated with poor black communities, and rising crime rates in northern cities. 
Promising to, “call to halt the relentless drift toward the welfare state,” Goldwater 
strongly opposed “self-indulgent pressure groups [who] seek special privilege favors at 
the expense of the general public taxpayer.”49  
By the summer of 1964, appealing to the resentments of middle class whites had 
proven an effective “wedge issue” for the Republican Party. The nominating speech 
delivered by Ronald Reagan at the Republican Convention regarding the dangers of 
liberalism and the welfare state elevated the former B movie star’s political profile, 
making him the darling of the conservative movement. After outlining his departure from 
the Democratic Party, Reagan linked both Johnson’s proposed Great Society initiative 
and the broader growth of government to the communist threat before directly 
condemning welfare abuse. He reminded the audience of a California woman who, “had 
six children, was pregnant with her seventh…Her husband was a laborer earning 250 
dollars a month. She wanted a divorce to get an 80 dollar raise. She's eligible for 330 
dollars a month in the Aid to Dependent Children Program. She got the idea,” Reagan 
told the audience, “from two women in her neighborhood who'd already done that very 
thing.”50 
In what would go down in conservative lore as “The Speech,” Reagan implied a 
direct correlation between the growth of the welfare state and broader communist threats 
declaring, “We are faced with the most evil enemy mankind has known in his long climb 
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from the swamp to the stars. There can be no security anywhere in the free world if there 
is no physical and economic stability within the United States. Those who ask us to trade 
our freedom for the soup kitchen of the welfare state,” Reagan said, “are architects of a 
policy of accommodation.”51 Reagan’s attack on welfare abuse at the 1964 Republican 
National Convention helped make him a rising star among conservatives. In the minds of 
many in attendance, he and not the Arizona senator, represented the future of the G.O.P. 
At the Illinois State Fair on August 19, Goldwater echoed Reagan’s refrain in his 
condemnation of the welfare state by criticizing the president for contributing to the 
collapsing values of the American underclass. "Telling people again and again,” he said, 
“that the federal government will take care of everything for them leads to the decline of 
personal and individual responsibility which is the base cause of the rise in crime and 
disregard for law and order."52 While neither Goldwater nor Reagan explicitly mentioned 
race or recent civil rights discord in their critique of welfare abuse, the message to their 
audience was clear: Your tax dollars are being doled out to undeserving and unlawful 
minorities by a liberal administration that is not protecting the nation’s values or its 
citizens. 
Goldwater further exploited white resentment on October 1 declaring, "If it is 
entirely proper for government to take from some and give to others, then won't some be 
led to believe that they can rightfully take from anyone who has more than they?" 
Drawing a thinly veiled parallel between welfare and dangerous urban communities, 
Goldwater continued, "Our wives, all women, feel unsafe in the street."53 These 
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insinuations spoke to the racial fears of middle-class America and promoted a return to 
the traditional values of limited government, free enterprise, and hard work. However 
they failed to acknowledge root cause explanations for black poverty such as systemic 
racism, centuries of violence and intimidation, as well as limited access to education and 
quality employment.    
Johnson won reelection with a plurality in excess of sixteen million votes, 
securing ninety-four percent of the black vote.54 By the 1964 Presidential election, the 
social division that would soon fracture American consensus in the coming years had not 
yet reached its volatile summit. While the Goldwater campaign’s racially coded rhetoric 
had resonated with many white Americans, the nation was not yet ready to hand the 
election to a candidate based solely on a law and order, limited government platform. 
Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign did, however, fortify law and 
order politics as a core precept of Republican political strategy, setting into motion a 
strategic, racially aware approach that would change the nation’s political landscape in 
subsequent campaign seasons. While Lyndon Johnson handily defeated the Arizona 
Senator, Goldwater carried five states in the Deep South. The capacity of Republican 
candidates to lure southern Democrats to the G.O.P would soon recalibrate the American 
political arena.  
Goldwater, like Wallace remains, “a prophet ahead of [his] time-who bore the 
burden of ideological and racial extremism.”55 Both men employed racially coded, law 
and order rhetoric in order to convert the white middle class’ apprehension regarding 
civil rights related unrest into political capital, while opposing the President’s liberal 
                                                 
54 Tom Wicker "Johnson Swamps Goldwater." New York Times, November 4, 1964. 
55 Flamm, 49. 
19 
 
agenda, which, by 1964, had only begun to lose traction. The next presidential election 
would hinge on similar partisan divisions as the nation unraveled. This time, the 
candidate that effectively channeled the country’s racial anxieties and offered law and 
order as a solution to America’s cascading social and political turmoil would not be 
denied.   
1965 
In his 1965 State of the Union Address, President Johnson outlined the core 
tenants of a new program that would utilize the nation’s booming prosperity in order to 
combat poverty and racial injustice. “America,” he told a joint session of Congress, “was 
only at the beginning of the road to the Great Society. Ahead now is a summit where 
freedom from the wants of the body can help fulfill the needs of the spirit.”56 The 
President’s ambitious vision for his nation would soon be sidetracked by an unpopular 
war in Vietnam as well as the continued escalation of racial tensions in the United States.  
Just months into his second term, the President watched from the Oval Office as 
racial unrest and violence in the South once again garnered national headlines and further 
stirred the nation’s racial anxieties. On February 18 civil rights demonstrators in Marion, 
Alabama, were attacked by local police, resulting in the death of twenty-six year old 
Jimmie Lee Jackson who died while defending his mother from a State Trooper’s 
nightstick.57 Jackson’s death escalated tensions between protestors and police, prompting 
activists to embark on a march from Selma to Montgomery. On March 7 in what would 
                                                 
56"Lyndon B. Johnson: Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union - January 4, 
1965." The American Presidency Project. Accessed March 12, 2017. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907.  
57 Craig Swanson, The Selma Campaign: Martin Luther King Jr., Jimmie Lee Jackson, and the 
Defining Struggle of the Civil Rights Era. (Bloomington, IN: Archway Publishing, 2014) 
20 
 
come to be known as “Bloody Sunday,” news cameras stationed near the Edmund Pettis 
Bridge captured Alabama State Troopers assaulting the peaceful marchers with batons 
and tear gas. Much of the nation responded in outrage to the unsettling footage, 
prompting the president to declare, ‘‘Americans everywhere join in deploring the 
brutality with which a number of Negro citizens of Alabama were treated when they 
sought to dramatize their deep and sincere interest in attaining the precious right to 
vote.’’58 Johnson again sympathized with demonstrators when, on March 15, he 
announced to the nation that, ‘‘their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just 
Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and 
injustice. And we shall overcome.’’59 Two days later, the President sent new voting rights 
legislation to Congress. 
The white middle class’ reaction to the unrest in Selma and the Civil Rights 
Movement’s recent advancements revealed a divided nation. A national Opinion 
Research Corporation poll taken in the immediate aftermath of Selma showed that 
although seventy-six percent of those surveyed supported new voting rights legislation, 
sixty-eight percent wanted to see moderation in its enforcement.60 One month later, a 
Gallup poll revealed that forty-five percent of participants felt that the Johnson 
Administration was moving too fast on integration efforts.61 These numbers revealed the 
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hesitation with which the nation’s white middle class supported civil rights progress. It 
was not difficult for a majority of whites to oppose Bull Connor’s brutal, state-sanctioned 
violence against peaceful demonstrators. However, as integration efforts moved from an 
idealized concept to a reality, many whites lessoned their support for measures that would 
bring actual and immediate racial change to their neighborhoods and schools. By broadly 
supporting only “moderate enforcement” of civil rights legislation, whites displayed a 
nervous reluctance to part with the long-established structures that supported the nation’s 
dominate racial order. 
On August 11, less than a week after the President signed the Voting Rights Act, 
the 1965 Watts Riot in Los Angeles sent shock waves throughout the nation. The riot 
began after officers attempted to detain twenty-one year old Marquette Frye for drunk 
driving in South Los Angeles in front of a crowd of local residents. A mob soon gathered 
at the scene, growing restless and violent shortly after a drunken Frye, along with his 
brother Ronald, were arrested. The six days of rioting that ensued left thirty-four dead, 
hundreds injured, and resulted in thirty-five million dollars in property damages.62 The 
chaos and anxiety surrounding the riots greatly expanded the racial resentments and 
anxieties of America’s white middle class. A national study conducted in the aftermath of 
the riots found that nearly half of those polled expressed fear of being attacked by a 
Negro, while forty-two percent reported experiencing increased social distance between 
the races as a result of the riot.63  
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As the National Guard worked to quell the third straight day of rioting and 
violence, an August 14th Los Angeles Times headline declared, "Racial Unrest Laid to 
Negro Family Failure," while on the same day the Wall Street Journal  announced, 
“Family Life Breakdown in Negro Slums Sows Seeds of Race Violence.”64 The Watts 
Riots expanded white America’s perceptions regarding the link between crime and the 
breakdown of the traditional family structure within the nation’s black, urban 
communities. As the nation followed news media coverage of the Watts Riots, a 
controversial report authored by Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
offered both explanations and a solution for the crime, poverty, and collective hardships 
facing America’s black inter cities. The report entitled The Negro Family: The Case for 
National Action, later known simply as the Moynihan Report, blamed systemic racial 
oppression, black illegitimacy rates, and the breakdown of the traditional family structure 
for the difficulties enveloping the nation’s African American communities. The report, 
released the same month as the Watts upheaval, would be a source of controversy 
surrounding conversations on race in America for decades to follow.65 
Moynihan’s findings warned that "The Negro family is the fundamental source of 
the weakness of the Negro community at the present time. At this point,” said the report, 
“the present tangle of pathology is capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from 
the white world."66 Moynihan elaborated on the failings of black matriarchal households 
the following year writing, “A community that allows a large number of young men to 
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grow up in broken families, dominated by women, never requiring any stable relationship 
to male authority, never requiring any set of rational expectations about the future - that 
community asks for and gets chaos.” The report concluded, “Crime, violence, unrest, 
disorder... that is not only to be expected, but they are very near to inevitable.”67  
Two years earlier, Moynihan coauthored a similar study entitled Beyond the 
Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italian, and Irish of New York City. The 
report used ethnicity to trace the cultural advancements and failures of New York’s white 
and nonwhite populations. The report described the dire consequences of broken homes 
in black communities when, 
The mother is forced to work (as the Negro mother so often is), when the father is 
incapable of contributing support (as the Negro father so often is), when fathers 
and mothers refuse to except responsibility for and resent their children, as Negro 
parents, overwhelmed by difficulties, so often do, and when the family situation, 
is left vague and ambiguous (as it so often is in Negro families).68  
 
Moynihan’s findings fed an increasingly intense debate surrounding race in 
America. To many middle class whites, the reports confirmed the biases and racial 
criticisms they had silently harbored for years. While both accounts linked generations of 
structural racism and slavery to the contemporary struggles of black America, their 
findings explicitly linked black matriarchal culture to the contemporary struggles and 
shortcomings of African American communities. This “tangle of pathology,” according 
to the report, bred crime, poverty, broken homes, and low academic achievement.  
While the report offered a scathing indictment of the nation’s history of systemic, 
white oppression, it could also be misrepresented as evidence that black culture was 
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inferior and wrought with pathological shortcomings. Bypassing the report’s root cause 
explanations (slavery, segregation, systemic racism), some whites, especially 
conservatives, instead focused primarily on Moynihan’s dire findings. In this way, the 
study’s results could be easily reframed as a harmful appraisal of the nation’s African 
American communities. Critics of the study claimed that it blamed the victims for their 
own poverty and promoted harmful black stereotypes.  
As the 1960s passed the halfway mark, many in Middle America began to grow 
weary of liberal allegations of structural racism and white oppression as crime rates 
continued to climb in the wake of both the passage of 1964’s Civil Rights Act as well as 
the recently enacted Voting Rights Act. By clinging to Moynihan’s findings, while 
downplaying the root causes that informed them, many middle class whites were able to 
dismiss claims that linked poverty and biased racial structures to the struggles of black 
communities. Systemic racism, segregation, and years of intimidation and violence were 
disregarded and culpability was placed on the shoulders of absent black fathers and 
dysfunctional family structures.  
  As the final weeks of December 1965 came to a close, a commission headed by 
former CIA director John McCone released a study entitled Violence in the City—An End 
or a Beginning?: A Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, 
1965. The report assessed the causes of the Watts riots and cited urbanization, 
unemployment, discrimination, and poverty as the primary sources of the unrest. It also 
criticized black leadership for the community’s lack of progress, the promotion of civil 
disobedience, as well as for, in some cases, “issuing brutal exhortations to violence.”69 
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The commission’s broader assessment of the upheaval in Los Angeles was emblematic of 
the era’s liberal optimism. The report cited, “defects in our development as a democratic 
society,” rather than moral decline or personal evil on behalf of those who participated in 
the riots.70 Calling for additional social programs and funding to address the poverty and 
unemployment that spawned the chaotic disturbance, the commission concluded that, “we 
cannot solve the problems of our slums by police power…It is no more possible to 
suppress rioting where its causes are fermenting than it is to hold the lid on a boiling 
pot.”71   
The report expressed the liberal viewpoint of the riots as manifestations of 
systemic injustice and poverty. To many on the left, the answer to the ghetto crisis was 
increased spending on anti-poverty programs such as housing and education as well as 
greater police oversight and the formation of a civilian review board to safeguard against 
police misconduct. Prominent activists within the black community fingered, “white 
leadership…which has caused millions of Negroes to be born and grow up in poverty and 
ignorance” as the underlying cause of the riots.72  
Conservatives, by contrast, condemned the moral failures of individuals rather 
than societal inequality. These voices blamed the rioters themselves as well as the 
liberalism that, in their view, bread a culture of perpetual dependency and entitlement. 
Provoking the resentments of middle class whites who funded the president’s Great 
Society with their tax dollars, conservatives claimed that the Johnson administration had 
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squandered revenue on the undeserving while, “raising false expectations and 
constructing an expansive as well as intrusive bureaucracy that trampled on the 
prerogatives of municipalities and the values of communities.”73 Will Herring, writing for 
the National Review directly linked the riots to leadership within the Civil Rights 
Movement. In an article entitled “Who Are the Guilty Ones?” he concluded, “If you are 
looking for those ultimately responsible for the murder, arson, and looting in Los 
Angeles, look to [civil rights leadership]: they are the guilty ones, these apostles of ‘non-
violence.’ They have taught anarchy and chaos by word and deed-and, no doubt with the 
best of intentions-they have found apt pupils everywhere, with intentions not the best.”74  
These divergent reactions to the Watts riots reveal the means by which the white 
middle class continued to fracture in its support for Civil Rights and the President’s 
optimistic plan to end poverty and racial injustice. These differing responses expose a 
perceptual divide that would shape the ways in which the white middle class viewed 
black America for generations to come. Were the riots the result of poverty and injustice 
or manifestations of a violent and criminal culture that had been emboldened by the 
government’s liberal reforms?  
Reagan 
With the burnt out ruins of the Watts Riots still smoldering in the minds of white 
voters, Ronald Reagan entered California’s gubernatorial race in early 1966 promoting 
law and order as a remedy for the state’s recent urban upheavals and mounting student 
protests. Declaring that city streets had become, “jungle paths after dark,” the former 
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Screen Actors Guild president utilized growing trepidation among California voters 
regarding the state’s liberal agenda and its role in facilitating social and racial discord 
within the state.75 In 1962, Reagan’s opponent, incumbent governor Pat Brown, coasted 
to an easy victory in the traditionally left-leaning state and was projected to recapture the 
governor’s office in 1966. However, mounting concerns over rising crime rates, the 
Watts Riots, and Reagan’s charismatic persona would present substantial obstacles for 
the governor in his reelection bid.   
Like Goldwater two years earlier, Reagan’s campaign rhetoric drew a parallel 
between liberal social programs and increases in crime and rioting. He condemned 
Johnson’s Great Society efforts for discouraging individual initiative, creating personal 
dependency on government, and growing a bloated and costly bureaucracy.76 However, 
Reagan’s greatest criticisms appealed directly to California’s recent rise in urban crime 
and mounting backlash from the Watts Riots.  
By 1966, following a ten year pattern, California’s murder rate had risen by 
fourteen percent, while robbery and rape rates also increased substantially. African 
Americans represented a disproportionate number of both the victims and perpetrators of 
this increase.77 Picking up on this alarming trend, the former movie actor utilized 
television ads that drew thinly-veiled parallels between dangerous urban crime and 
minority communities. One commercial from Reagan’s 1966 campaign warned viewers, 
"Every day the sun goes down, the jungle comes a little closer." As the camera panned to 
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a white woman alone on a foreboding street, the ad appealed to mounting trepidation of 
urban crime and accessed deeply embedded fears of white women as victims of violent 
crime. "There isn't a city street,” said the ad, “that's safe for our women after dark."78  
Further exploiting rising crime rates and extending his message to illicit drug use, 
Reagan declared in September of 1966, "Narcotics traffic has mushroomed like a rush 
hour jam on the freeway, and directly in its path -as its prime target – is our youth, our 
sons and daughters."79 Reagan’s language in both television ads and on the campaign trail 
warned of a California backsliding into social chaos at the hands of dangerous criminal 
elements, liberal government, and feckless leadership. Throughout the summer and fall of 
1966, he painted a dire panorama of a society falling prey to moral perversion, rising 
crime, and racial discord, framing his Democratic opponent as a facilitator of California’s 
cultural upheaval. As anxious middle class voters fell under the sway of the gifted 
orator’s message of conservatism and tough-on-crime campaign promises, his lead in the 
polls steadily grew throughout the 1966 election season. By June, Reagan’s message had 
resonated with voters and earned him a fifty-one to thirty-seven percent lead over the 
incumbent governor.80 
Much of Reagan’s lead in the summer months stemmed from his hardline stance 
regarding the student protests on the U.C Berkeley campus. By mid-decade the university 
had emerged as an epicenter for the nascent countercultural revolution that gave birth to 
the student anti-war movement and helped facilitate the growth of militant black power 
organizations. Demonstrations on the campus had steadily increased both in numbers and 
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intensity since 1964, as students defiantly challenged the authority of the school’s 
president Clark Kerr. In the spring of 1966, a bomb exploded outside of the university’s 
Vietnam Day Committee office, drawing increased national attention to the nation’s 
broader, student-led, anti-war movement which, by mid-decade, had gained momentum 
around the country.81 By the summer of 1966, California voters as well as much of 
Middle America, had begun to identify the campus protesters with a myriad of societal 
ills including political radicalism, sexual promiscuity, communism, and illicit drug use. 
Vowing to “clean up the mess at Berkeley,” Reagan criticized leftist agitators, telling an 
audience at San Francisco’s Cow Palace on May 12, “beatniks, radicals and filthy speech 
advocates” have more to do “with rioting, with anarchy than academic freedom.” He 
extended his criticism to the administration and faculty who, “press their particular value 
judgments” on students, and promote “a leadership gap and a morality and decency gap” 
within the university. He also suggested a code of conduct be imposed on faculty in order 
to “force them to serve as examples of good behavior and decency.”82  
Reagan used Berkeley’s student demonstrations as a cultural line of demarcation, 
allowing him to elicit support from white, middle class Californians who viewed the 
campus movement as a threat to the establishment and to the broader societal order. 
Future Nixon advisor H. R. Haldeman counseled the Reagan campaign to exploit the 
unrest at Berkeley and channel it into a referendum against Brown in the coming election. 
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Haldeman advised, "Berkley is clearly an issue to be thoroughly and effectively 
exploited. Brown is scared of it, and for good reason.”83   
Extending his criticism of the Berkley protests to the Civil Rights Movement, 
Reagan linked civil disobedience to inadequate liberal leadership that protected criminals 
at the expense of the broader public safety. He also condemned the governor’s failure to 
deploy the National Guard to disperse recent racially charged protests in San Francisco, 
declaring in an October debate that Brown “had not profited at all from the experience of 
Watts and has done nothing to forestall future disturbances in possible trouble spots.”84 
At Berkeley’s Boalt Hall, Reagan furthered his appeal to nervous white voters, many of 
whom connected rioting to the Civil Rights Movement when he declared, "The leaders of 
the Negro community who have urged civil disobedience,” he said, “have forfeited their 
right to leadership."85  
Reagan was not alone in directly criticizing the Civil Rights Movement and its 
leadership for engaging in civil disobedience. Months earlier, FBI director J. Edgar 
Hoover declared, "civil disobedience [is] a seditious slogan of gross irresponsibility, 
[and] has captured the imagination of citizens...I am greatly concerned that certain racial 
leaders are doing the Civil Rights  Movement a great disservice by suggesting that 
citizens need only obey the laws with which they agree. Such an attitude,” he concluded, 
“breeds disrespect for the law and even civil disorder and rioting."86  
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With California’s 1966 gubernatorial election drawing near, Pat Brown charged 
his Republican opponent with exploiting a rising tide of white resentment for political 
gain. Just days before the election on an episode of NBC’s Meet the Press, Reagan 
replied that the backlash was “nothing more than the concerns people have for … 
extremists in the civil rights movement taking to the streets, the use of violence, of 
demonstrations instead of an orderly process of appealing wrongs through legitimate 
channels.”87 Reagan’s appearance on the program was a final appeal to the California 
voters who would soon send the charismatic conservative to the governor’s mansion in 
Sacramento. In the fall of 1966, Reagan defeated Democrat Pat Brown; winning fifty-
eight percent of the vote and carrying all but three California counties.88 In the wake of 
his defeat in November, the ousted governor acknowledged the role of escalating racial 
tensions in his loss declaring, “They [white voters] felt that I was too friendly with the 
blacks. They just tarred and feathered me with it and said, ‘Put a guy in there that will put 
these colored guys in their place.’"89 Whether we like it or not,” said Brown, “people 
want separation of the races.”90 
In a tumultuous year of increased urban unrest and anti-war protest, Reagan’s 
campaign successfully channeled fear from the Watts Riot, campus demonstrations, and 
rising crime into a potent message that linked the breakdown of law and order to his 
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opponent’s liberal agenda.91 Reagan’s subsequent rise to national prominence further 
demonstrated the efficacy of racially coded, law and order language in compelling voters 
to elect tough-on-crime political actors who promised to protect the broader public safety 
and social order. While the Goldwater campaign emerged in the months before urban 
upheavals had begun to envelope northern cities, Reagan was the beneficiary of better 
timing and a more appealing persona. Unlike Wallace and Goldwater, he would profit 
directly from the escalation of urban rioting and successfully convince California voters, 
and in time the nation, that rising crime, racial turmoil, and a drug addled counterculture 
were manifestations of failed liberal doctrine. Reagan channeled a public sentiment that 
was growing increasingly skeptical of Johnson’s reforms. In doing so, he set in motion a 
rising tide of conservatism that would reshape the American political landscape in 
subsequent decades.  
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Following Ronald Reagan’s successful 1966 bid for the California governorship, 
conservative politicians around the nation received a surge of support. This chapter 
examines the causes and consequences of that development. It begins with an 
examination of 1967’s Newark and Detroit riots and concludes with the 1968 Presidential 
election. Using polling data, pertinent secondary sources, as well as periodicals from the 
era, this chapter explores how racial unrest, crime, and the Johnson administration’s 
liberal agenda impacted white middle class perceptions of the nation’s African American 
population as the decade’s turbulence reached a critical climax. The rise of Black Power, 
continued urban uprisings, as well as the Kerner Commission’s startling findings 
highlight the means by which race informed the period’s divisive turmoil.  
In the wake of 1968’s Tet Offensive in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson fell 
deeper into a hopeless despair, announcing his withdrawal from the American political 
arena. Chapter two pays close attention to the subsequent realignment of the nation’s 
political landscape as the perilous year witnessed the assassinations of Martin Luther 
King and Robert Kennedy, as well as the chaos surrounding the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago. With Vietnam and street riots hanging heavily in the nation’s 
consciousness, Republican hopeful Richard Nixon looked to the racially charged 
Southern Strategy, channeling the resentments and fears of the white middle class. For 
many of these “Forgotten Americans,” law and order had become the most important 
issue of the 1968 election season. Additionally, this chapter examines the language used 
by both Nixon and third party candidate George Wallace as they competed for white 
voters who had grown uneasy with the era’s volatile unrest and social change. Both 
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candidates embraced law and order, layering their campaign messages with racially 
coded appeals that nodded at the resentments of white voters. Chapter two closes by 
linking Nixon’s election to the collapse of New Deal order as the decade’s early 
optimism was replaced by a loss of hope and unity.  
1967 
"To the conservative mind the riot is essentially a revolution against civilization,” 
wrote Tom Hayden who, by 1967, had become among the nation’s most high-profile 
student activists. “To the liberal mind,” he said, “[riots are] an expression of helpless 
frustration. While the conservative is hostile and the liberal generous toward those who 
riot, both assume that the riot is a form of lawless, mob behavior. Against these two 
fundamentally similar concepts, a third one must be asserted, the concept that a riot 
represents a people making history."92 Hayden’s assessment captures the disparate lenses 
through which the nation viewed the forty-three racial disturbances that erupted in 1966 
and the 164 that followed in the first nine months of the following year. At various times, 
the National Guard occupied eight major cities as riots erupted throughout 1967’s long 
hot summer.93 The year would mark the height of the nation’s racial discord and greatly 
widen the contentious gulf between African American populations and the white middle 
class as racial tensions and civil unrest continued to divide the country.  
On July 12, John Smith, a black cab driver, was involved in an altercation with 
police in Newark, New Jersey. A restless crowd gathered later that evening and alleged 
police brutality. In the widespread rioting and looting that ensued, twenty-three of the 
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city’s black residents were killed, while a shocked nation sat transfixed in front of their 
television sets as the racial tension that had simmered for months exploded from the 
Newark ghetto. Despite the deployment of the National Guard, the riot continued for 
nearly five days, leaving over 750 injured, over one thousand jailed, and property 
damages in excess of ten million dollars before coming to a close on July 17, 1967.94 
Less than a week after the unrest in Newark was quelled, police raided an 
afterhours establishment at the intersection of Twelfth Street and Clarimount Avenue in 
Detroit. After arresting eighty-two of the illegal establishment’s patrons, restless 
onlookers claimed that law enforcement used unnecessary force in detaining those in 
attendance. By the next morning rioting was underway near the club. Like the Watts and 
Newark riots, the unrest was sparked by allegations of police brutality. However, the 
uprisings were also expressions of years of underlying segregation, unemployment, and 
frustration with the perceived racial injustices leveled against the city’s black residents. 
The riot resulted in the deployment of forty-seven hundred paratroopers, forty-three 
deaths, seven thousand arrests, and twenty-seven hundred businesses looted.95 The unrest 
in Detroit, like the Newark riot, shocked the nation and altered white middle class 
perceptions of the Civil Rights Movement, Johnson’s Great Society, as well as country’s 
broader black population.  
On the one month anniversary of the Detroit riots, H. Rap Brown, chairman of the 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and a high profile member of the 
militant Black Panthers organization declared, "We live in the belly of the monster. So 
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it's up to us to destroy its brain. When we do this not only will Africa be free but all 
people oppressed by the man will be free."96 Just weeks earlier, Brown made national 
headlines when he urged blacks in Jersey City to, "wage guerrilla war on the honkie 
white man."97 “If America don't come around,” he declared, “we going to burn it 
down."98 Brown’s comments are emblematic of the nascent Black Power movement that 
began to galvanize mid-decade after Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale established the 
Black Panthers in the fall of 1966.  
In The Unraveling of America, author Alan Matusow describes the archetypical 
black militant of the mid to late 1960s as “proud of his race, politically hip, savvy to 
discrimination, tolerant of violence, the new ghetto man reached maturity in the 1960s, 
which explains why centuries of repressed black anger erupted it when it did. The riots,” 
wrote Matusow, “were [his] contribution to the black protest movement. His 
announcement that he would not passively submit to a life of discrimination and 
poverty.”99 The high profile rise of Black Power personalities like Brown, Stokely 
Carmichael, and Eldridge Cleaver, who professed to raping white women as an act of 
political insurrection, coincided with the escalation of 1967’s urban unrest.100 Black 
militancy and urban riots significantly impacted the ways in which the white middle class 
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perceived black America, as the nation and its president continued to unravel amid 
intensifying racial, social, and political unrest. 
Kerner Commission 
The 1967 Detroit and Newark riots forced President Johnson to concede that his 
support for civil rights as well as his Great Society initiatives were negatively impacting 
his standing among middle-class whites. By the autumn of that year, opinion polls 
showed his approval rating at the lowest of any president since Harry Truman during the 
Korean War.101 In July, Johnson formed the Kerner Commission to assess the causality of 
the riots. The committee’s findings left Johnson with few options and less hope. The 
President had intended to demonstrate to the nation his resolve to confront the season’s 
racial unrest. Instead, the commission’s report offered a bleak appraisal of race in 
America and warned “Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, and one 
white-separate and unequal.” The report claimed that, “Segregation and poverty have 
created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white 
Americans. What white Americans have never fully understood-but what the Negro can 
never forget-is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions 
created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”102  
The report attributed the 1967 riots to systemic police misconduct stating that 
“Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in Negro 
neighborhoods.” It also found that the increasingly militarized police tactics in urban 
areas had led blacks to associate law enforcement with “white power, white racism, and 
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white oppression.”103 As a result, the commission called for billions in additional funding 
to urban America and an increased devotion to meaningful civil rights reform.  
Johnson was caught off guard by the degree to which the report’s findings 
exposed racial tension and harmfully linked the urban riots to his administration’s social 
programs and reforms. According to the commission’s account, the President’s civil 
rights efforts had failed to heal the nation’s racial divisions and would require billions in 
additional funding to succeed. The President viewed the report as a political liability and 
was angered at its failure to recognize his budgetary limitations as well as his 
contributions to civil rights reform. Johnson publically ignored the report for months, 
provoking criticism from liberals and conservatives alike. In March 1968, he finally 
acknowledged that, although its findings were thorough, he did not support all of the 
commission’s recommendations. Johnson advisor Harry McPherson described the 
dilemma facing the president as the nation began to lose faith in his reforms. "We talk 
about the multitude of good programs going into the cities,” said McPherson, “and yet 
there are riots, which suggests that the programs are no good, or the Negroes are past 
saving."104  
 Johnson’s tepid recognition of the Kerner Commission coincided with continued 
national tension over the Vietnam War and loss of support for his Great Society 
programs, many of which were increasingly viewed by white America as contributing to 
the riots. Delivering a speech in Kansas City just weeks after the Detroit uprising, 
Johnson publically acknowledged the need to restore order. "We cannot,” he said, 
“tolerate behavior that destroys what generations of men and women have built here in 
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America-no matter what stimulates that behavior, and no matter what is offered to try to 
justify it."105  
Despite his denouncement of the riots, President Johnson would soon be forced to 
acknowledge the impact of urban unrest and racial tension on his political buoyancy. 
Polling data indicates that in the early 1960s many whites in the North were permissive, 
if not supportive, of the civil rights movement. A small majority of those polled were in 
favor of measured racial progress and a reprieve from the era’s highly visible and 
unsettling images of racial injustice and brutality. In its formative stages, the Civil Rights 
Movement was personified by Martin Luther King’s Christian leadership and non-violent 
demonstrations, many of which were sanctioned by middle-class whites in the North. 
These efforts were often met with tepid approval, if not outright support, in large measure 
because the agitation, protest, and unrest was “down there” and had not yet reached 
northern cities.106  
Prior to the high profile riots that shocked the nation, many whites in the North 
viewed the fire hoses and snarling dogs in Birmingham as an unjust assault and had 
condemned Bull Connor’s cruel, militant response to the peaceful demonstrations. The 
tear gas and billy clubs deployed in Selma too closely resembled the militancy of 
European fascism that was still fresh in the nation’s memory. Much of white America 
watched in horror as news cameras captured Alabama State Troopers brandishing gas 
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masks and savaging female marchers at the foot of the Edmund Pettis Bridge. Continuing 
coverage of the murder of three civil rights activists in Neshoba County Mississippi the 
previous year was further cause for both outrage and empathy. The imagery associated 
with these injustices justified support for Johnson’s civil rights reforms and placed 
southern segregationists on the wrong side of the nation’s broader public opinion.107  
However, as the 1960s grew increasingly contentious, media coverage of sit-ins 
and orderly marches began to give way to shocking footage of urban riots. With the 
ascent of black militancy, rising crime rates, and mounting white backlash, the President 
began to lose public support for his Great Society and role in championing civil rights 
legislation.108As the decade wore on and the war in Southeast Asia continued to escalate, 
middle class whites increasingly viewed the President with contempt. In the wake of 
mounting racial unrest, many began to lessen their sympathy for problems associated 
with African American communities.109 This anxious white population often did not view 
the riots as political expressions stemming from centuries of racial injustice, but instead 
as manifestations of a culture that was increasingly prone to violence and crime. 
The Racial Divide 
As the decade’s upheaval continued through the summer of 1967, many whites 
were startled by the volatile racial unrest overtaking northern cities. A survey conducted 
in the immediate aftermath of the Newark and Detroit riots revealed that “the number of 
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whites fearful for their personal safety rose from forty-three to fifty-one percent by 
August 1967."110 Sixty percent of whites thought the police should use deadly force 
against looters and twice as many whites as blacks felt that the riots were organized.111 
These numbers reveal the ways in which the riots impacted the white middle class’ 
already tenuous support for racial progress.  
In the wake of 1967’s explosive racial turmoil, white fear compounded as many in 
Middle America failed to understand why urban blacks had resorted to violence and 
rioting. Why, they wondered, had blacks destroyed their own communities? How long 
until urban unrest found its way to their suburbs? Were the riots political acts of protest, 
or were they manifestations of a violent and criminal culture? In the wake of the riots, an 
elderly white man from California said of African American’s "they need food, work, and 
education but they just use these as excuses to riot." A housewife from Michigan 
expressed little empathy for rioters saying, "They have everything that I have and some 
have even more."112  
Much of white America, along with its President, viewed the passage of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act the following year, as well as the War on Poverty 
as evidence of racial progress. However, when racial tension and urban violence 
continued to escalate rather than subside, many whites increasingly linked African 
Americans, especially those living in the nation’s urban centers, to violence and crime.113 
These perceptions were informed by staggering rises in violent crime, assault, robbery, 
rape, and theft. Crime in these categories nearly doubled from 1960 to the decade’s end, 
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while murders rose from 9,110 to 14,760.114 Anxious middle class whites increasingly 
ignored liberal root cause explanations for rising crime within the nation’s inner cities. 
The cumulative impact of slavery, segregation, and centuries of systemic violence and 
intimidation were often dismissed or underemphasized as the immediate shock of the 
riots overtook media headlines and newspaper reports. The confident idealism that had 
fueled the President’s liberal political ambitions throughout the decade had begun to fade 
as the nation increasingly lost faith in government’s ability to end poverty, safe-guard the 
streets, and ease tensions between the county’s black and white populations.  
This loss of faith was manifest throughout the nation as much of the white middle 
class rescinded its fragile empathy for the Civil Rights Movement.115 The impact of 
televised looting and enflamed cities slowed civil rights progress and altered how many 
whites viewed the nation’s black population. In July 1966, sixty-five percent of whites 
felt that blacks had “less ambition” and fifty percent thought that they had “looser 
morals” than their white counterparts. In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 riots, these 
figures increased to seventy and fifty-eight percent respectively. Questions from the same 
survey about whether blacks had "less native intelligence" or desired to "live off the 
handout” generated similar responses.116 These shifting perceptions of race, public safety, 
and the civil rights movement emerged as political liabilities for those who championed 
the liberal cause. Chicago congressman Roman Pucinski admitted "Go into any home, 
any bar, any barbershop and you will find people are not talking about Vietnam or rising 
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prices or prosperity. They are talking about Martin Luther King and how they are moving 
in on us and what is going to happen to our neighborhood.”117 
Newsweek captured the era’s waning support for the protracted civil rights 
struggle noting, "The country seems to be retreating from active concern with its black 
minority-as the nation did nearly a century ago with the demise of reconstruction."118 The 
article profiled a frustrated and fatigued white laborer from Middle America who warned 
readers, "They think they've heard from black power, wait till they hear from white 
power-the little slob, G.I. Joe, the guy who breaks his ass and makes this country go. 
Boy, he's getting sick and tired of all this mess. One day he'll get fed up and when he 
does, look out!"119   
A letter from a white father of five to U.S senator Sam Ervin captures a similar 
sentiment, one that, by early 1968, had begun to reverberate across the nation: 
I'm sick of crime everywhere. I'm sick of riots. I'm sick of "poor" people 
demonstrations (Black, white, red, yellow, purple, green or any other color!) I’m 
sick of the U.S Supreme Court ruling for the good of a very small part rather than 
the whole of our society....I’m sick of the lack of law-enforcement....I’m sick of 
Vietnam....I’m sick of hippies, LSD, drugs, and all of the promotion the news 
media give them...but most of all, I'm sick of constantly being kicked in the teeth 
for staying home, minding my own business, working steadily, paying my bills 
and taxes, raising my children to be decent citizens, managing my financial affairs 
so I will not become a ward of the city, county, or state, and footing the bill for all 
the minuses mentioned herein.120 
 
These sentiments reveal much about the nation’s disenfranchisement with the 
decade’s volatile racial, social, and political divisions. They also outline the extent to 
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which the white middle class had grown increasingly vulnerable to the racialized law and 
order rhetoric that had, by the 1968 election season, begun to significantly reshape the 
American political landscape.  
1968 
“In 1968, America was a wounded nation,” said American historian Thurston 
Clarke. “The wounds were moral ones; the Vietnam War and three summers of inner-city 
riots had inflicted them on the national soul, challenging Americans' belief that they were 
a uniquely noble and honorable people.”121 Clarke’s observation articulates the means by 
which, by 1968, the United States, like its President, had succumb to the turmoil that had 
begun to erode the nation from within. The year would mark the height of America’s 
social and political unrest as blood continued to flow from the jungles of Southeast Asia, 
the streets of the nation’s inflamed ghettos, and from the balconies and podiums where its 
greatest advocates of peace were slain by the era’s darker impulses.     
In January, the Tet Offensive solidified the country’s skepticism regarding a 
victory in Vietnam and sent the President into a state of hopeless despair from which he 
never fully recovered. Johnson declared in March that he would not seek reelection. In 
the wake of his announcement, support for Democratic presidential candidates Robert 
Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy began to galvanize as Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
prepared his own bid for the Oval Office. Just days after the President’s announcement, 
James Earl Ray shot and killed Martin Luther King in Memphis, Tennessee. As news of 
King’s death spread, over sixty American cities erupted in riots leading to forty-three 
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deaths, more than three-thousand injuries, and twenty-seven thousand arrests.122 Two 
months later, Robert Kennedy was shot dead after delivering a campaign speech in Los 
Angeles. The optimism and promise that characterized the early 1960s had dissolved into 
fear and dread as, "across the country, the young blamed their unyielding elders; the 
elders blamed the disorderly young. Black militants blamed white racism and fearful 
whites blamed black power."123 Not since the Civil War had the United States been so 
divided. Much like the War Between the States one hundred years earlier, America in 
1968 found itself fractured over a seemingly endless war, racial animus, and the loss of 
an idealism that had once seemed unwavering.  
Chicago 
As the number of American troops stationed in Vietnam peaked at 541,000 in 
August, anti-war protests surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago pitted youthful demonstrators against police and the Illinois National Guard.124 
The agitation surrounding the convention emerged as a power struggle between free 
expression in the city’s public spaces and law and order. The blue collar police force 
exchanged slurs and blows with affluent, and what many perceived as, entitled kids from 
the suburbs. Led by the era’s infamous new-left torchbearers Abbie Hoffman and Tom 
Hayden, these demonstrations represented the generational fracture between the nation’s 
youthful dissidents and the powers that be. 
With anxious delegates shouting and shoving inside Chicago’s International 
Amphitheatre, the nation watched as tensions mounted between protesters and law 
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enforcement. After several days of confrontation, violence erupted between the police 
force and demonstrators. Press coverage of the event exposed a Democratic Party that 
was unraveling in full view of the country. To those watching the coverage on television, 
the Democrats seemed unable to stabilize their party. Convincing voters to hand the 
presidential election to Vice President Hubert Humphrey would prove difficult. 
Democratic Mayor Richard Daley presided over the convention and sounded the 
call for law and order. As tensions mounted, Daley promised, “As long as I am mayor, 
there will be law and order in Chicago. Nobody is going to take over this city.”125 The 
mayor was a walking embodiment of his city’s blue collar identity; the antithesis of the 
radical leftist agitators that had stirred his city’s youth into a volatile frenzy. For him, the 
conflict between demonstrators and police was personal. In the wake of the riots and 
looting that followed King’s assassination months earlier, Daley declared that police 
should “have had instructions to shoot arsonists and looters-arsonist to kill and looters to 
maim and detain.”126 Now, with a divided nation watching his city descend into chaos, 
the mayor would not back down.  
While covering the escalating brutality outside of the Democratic National 
Convention, Walter Cronkite referred to the police force as “thugs.” Mayor Daley, 
objecting to the negative characterization of police, subsequently demanded equal air 
time. In an interview on August 29, the Chicago Mayor defended law enforcement 
efforts. Viewers overwhelmingly agreed with Mayor Daley's defense of his officers and 
the public support that followed the interview stood as a potent indication of the white 
middle class’ broader disapproval of civil unrest and riots. CBS received over nine-
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thousand letters, ninety percent of which were critical of the networks portrayal of the 
unrest outside the convention. A Gallup poll found that by a margin of fifty-six to thirty-
one percent, Americans approved of the mayor's handling of the demonstrators. A Harris 
poll reported that sixty-six percent of those surveyed sided with Daley and the police.127  
The overwhelming response to the Daley interview was a key indication that 
public safety and law and order were the primary issue facing white middle class voters 
in the coming election. Time magazine reported, "Law and order now looms as the 
number one issue of 1968, even overshadowing the war that keeps more than 500,000 
American servicemen in combat in Southeast Asia."128 By the summer of 1968, many 
Americans were exasperated with the decade’s turmoil and seemingly endless uprisings. 
They had witnessed crime rates soar, cities burn, youth revolt, black militancy, and now 
Democratic delegates shoved each other, while outside, tear gas obscured another violent 
confrontation between authority and a dissenting mob. Law and order had become the 
country’s primary concern and the coming election would serve as a referendum on the 
social, political, and economic changes that had fractured the last vestiges of the nation’s 
post-war consensus. Economic prosperity had slowed, crime was rampant, and the war 
dragged on, while the New Deal order that had once promised so much, began to fade 
along with Hubert Humphry’s hopes of returning to the White House. 
Nixon’s Revival and the Southern Strategy  
From the Miami Beach Convention Center in August 1968, Richard Nixon 
accepted the Republican Party’s presidential nomination. As he addressed the audience, 
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he promised to restore law and order to a divided and anxious nation. Nixon condemned 
the Johnson administration for allowing the United States to descend into chaos 
declaring, “When the nation with the greatest tradition of rule of law is plagued by 
unprecedented lawlessness, when a nation that has been known for centuries for equality 
of opportunity is torn by unprecedented racial violence, it is time for new leadership in 
America."129  
Nixon’s address to the delegates in Florida made multiple references to, “cities 
enveloped in smoke and flame” and “sirens in the night.” He peppered his language with 
pleas to the, “great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans -- the non-shouters; 
the non-demonstrators.” To these voters he promised, “The first civil right of every 
American is to be free from domestic violence, and that right must be guaranteed in this 
country.” “The wave of crime,” he declared, “is not going to be the wave of the future in 
the United States of America.”130 In his 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon would make 
seventeen speeches regarding law and order. His language nodded to the white middle 
class resentments that had followed in the wake of the decade’s civil disobedience and 
racial unrest. “The increase in the crime rate,” he said, “can be traced directly to the 
spread of the corrosive doctrine that every citizen has the inherent right to decide for 
himself which laws to obey and when to disobey them."131 
Throughout 1968, the Nixon campaign worked to convert the era’s racial tensions 
and fear into political capital. Exploiting white middle class anxiety regarding public 
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safety, the campaign relied on a Southern Strategy with racially coded promises to restore 
law and order. This approach would facilitate an exodus from the Democratic Party in the 
South on the grounds that party leadership had neglected its core base by enacting liberal 
reforms that promoted lawlessness, protected criminals, and disproportionally benefited 
black communities. The campaign hoped to attract northern Catholics, labor leaders, and 
conservative southern Democrats who had become alienated by civil rights related unrest, 
endless rioting, and the era’s broader cultural upheaval.132 Republicans claimed that 
Democrats had enacted policy that promoted social discord and permitted racial strife to 
infiltrate middle-class neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools. Nixon offered a 
conservative alternative which promised to upend the Johnson administration’s liberal 
agenda, appealing to the “silent majority” who wished to see the country returned to the 
stability and conservative values of previous eras. 
 Nixon Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman admitted the necessity of employing 
covertly racial language when applying the strategy to alienated white voters admitting, 
"You have to emphasize the fact that the whole problem is really the blacks. The key is to 
devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to."133 Nixon’s Domestic Affairs 
Councilor, John Ehrlichman, confirmed that, "Subliminal appeal to the anti-black voter 
was always present in Nixon’s statements and speeches."134  
“You start out by saying nigger, nigger, nigger,” confessed former Republican 
National Committee chairman and strategist Lee Atwater as he outlined the racially 
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coded appeal that anchored the Southern Strategy. “By 1968,” he said, “you can’t say 
nigger—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and 
you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things 
you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get 
hurt worse than whites. We want to cut this,” he continued, “is much more abstract than 
even the busing thing and a hell of a lot more abstract than nigger, nigger.”135 In 
describing the evolution of coded appeals that targeted the racial anxieties of middle class 
whites, Atwater articulated a strategy that would help propel Nixon to the White House 
and alter the American political landscape for generations.136 
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford issued a common sense plea that 
reverberated across the once solidly Democratic South. "How long,” he asked, “are we 
going to abdicate law and order in favor of a soft social theory that the man who heaves a 
brick through your window or tosses a firebomb into your car is simply the 
misunderstood and underprivileged product of a broken home?"137 This message 
articulated the sentiment that centered Nixon’s appeal to voters across the nation and 
reveals the underlying resentment that drove the Southern Strategy. Ford’s message was 
not lost on traditional Democrats in both the North and South who increasingly viewed 
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the Johnson administration with growing distrust and mounting apprehension. As a result, 
the 1968 Presidential election would find twelve million voters deserting the Democratic 
Party.138  
Kevin Phillips’s landmark study The Emerging Republican Majority analyzed the 
impact of race in realigning the American political landscape. The future Nixon advisor 
poignantly observed that, “Historically, our party system has reflected layer upon layer of 
group oppositions. The prevailing cleavages in American voting behavior,” he said, 
“have been ethnic and cultural. Politically, at least, the United States has not been a very 
effective melting pot. The Negro problem, having become a national rather than a local 
one, is the principal cause of the breakup of the New Deal coalition.”139  
Phillips anticipated a white exodus from the Democratic Party, as it had 
increasingly become identified with African Americans rather than the New Deal 
programs that had primarily benefited whites during the Great Depression. Southerners, 
predicted Phillips, would desert the party that had claimed their political allegiance since 
the Civil War. He concluded that, "Ethnic and cultural division has so often shaped 
American politics that, given the immense mid-century impact of Negro enfranchisement 
and integration, reaction to this change almost inevitably had to result in political 
realignment."140  
Phillips observed that white southern Democrats had grown alienated by the 
party’s support for civil rights legislation and War on Poverty programs that integrated 
their communities and channeled tax revenue into African American communities. Nixon 
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stood to gain scores of new voters as a result of mounting animus toward black America. 
Describing this transition, Warren Weaver of the New York Times observed, "Full racial 
polarization is an essential ingredient of [the Southern Strategy’s] political pragmatism. 
They want to see a black Democratic Party, particularly in the South, because this will 
drive into the Republican Party precisely the kind of anti-Negro whites who will help 
constitute the emerging majority. This even leads [them] to support some civil rights 
efforts."141 
1968 Presidential Election 
Advancing the Southern Strategy, Nixon and his advisors carefully measured their 
position on law and order, safeguarding their platform against claims of racial extremism. 
They understood the necessity of leveling racially coded appeals to disillusioned white 
voters, while still appearing moderate next to the independent late-comer George Wallace 
and his reckless provocations. As a third party candidate, Wallace had grown more 
zealous in the months leading up to the 1968 election, declaring from the campaign trail, 
“We don't have riots in Alabama. They start a riot down there, first one of 'em to pick up 
a brick gets a bullet in the brain, that's all. And then you walk over to the next one and 
say, all right, pick up a brick. We just want to see you pick up one of them bricks, 
now!"142 He followed the diatribe by promising to shoot arsonists and looters and 
famously threatened to drive his car over demonstrators. Campaigning in California, 
Wallace criticized “pseudo-intellectuals” who equated crime in black communities to 
societal inequality and poverty. He lambasted liberals for rationalizing criminal behavior 
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in poor communities by claiming, "The killer didn't get enough watermelon to eat when 
he was ten years old."143  
Wallace's rhetoric entertained and aroused white middle class audiences; stirring 
them to a frenzied state with racial insinuations that evoked negative images of African 
Americans. Following one rally, Wallace told a reporter, "Did you see those women in 
there? They were hysterical about their children. Folks are mad about law and order and 
about schools... race mixing doesn't work. Show me a place where it worked."144 His 
language and innuendo linked civil rights protest with a broader breakdown of law and 
order. A commercial from his 1968 presidential campaign depicted riots in the streets, 
imploring viewers to, “Take a good look. This was done by anarchists, revolutionaries - 
the Molotov cocktail set. Ask yourself why are the anti-American, anti-God, anarchists 
also anti-Wallace? Want to get rid of them? Then don't waste your vote on those who 
encourage illegal marches.” The ad then asked voters to, “Vote for a law-abiding, God-
fearing America. It takes courage. Wallace has it. Do you?”145  
Wallace echoed this sentiment with emphatic pleas to audiences throughout the 
nation. The Alabama governor warned of a world backsliding into chaos at the hands of 
communists, beatniks, and civil rights agitators, all of whom were contributing to the 
decline of societal order. Along the campaign trail, Wallace shouted, “It's a sad day in our 
country when you cannot walk even in your neighborhood at night or even in the daytime 
because both national parties in the last number of years have [pandered to] every group 
of anarchists that have ever roamed the streets of San Francisco, Los Angeles and 
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throughout the country.” He concluded his rant warning the crowd, “And now they've 
created themselves a Frankenstein monster and the chickens are coming home to roost all 
over this country.”146  
The majority of Wallace’s 1968 support came from protestant, Goldwater 
supporters in the South and Catholic union members in the North. Three quarters of those 
who supported Wallace were in favor of slowing racial integration, while seventy percent 
expressed anxiety about recent riots and street crime.147 These numbers reflect the 
anxiety of northern, middle-class whites who had grown tired of integration and riots. 
They, more so than their affluent neighbors, were likely to be directly impacted by newly 
integrated spaces; sharing public facilities that had once belonged solely to whites.  
To these voters, Wallace represented a reprieve from the social changes that had 
begun to leave them displaced and nervous about losing their tentative grasp on the 
middle class. Many felt compelled to protect the prevailing structures that assured their 
social and economic superiority. Integration violated a long established order - a 
hierarchy of social belonging and place that threatened dominant white status; often 
eliciting visceral responses of fear and anger. The true source of racial animus for many 
of these voters was the threat of falling from a well-established social ranking - one that 
had assured them generations of supremacy.  Many of the white voters likely to support 
Wallace felt unable to escape black encroachment of their schools, factory floors, public 
facilities, and neighborhoods. They viewed integration as a zero-sum game. Black 
America’s foothold into the middle class was arriving at their expense.  
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Social psychologists Richard Eibach and Thomas Keegan studied the degree to 
which the human mind processed these losses and applied their research to whites 
experiencing integration. They observed that, “The human mind seeks to assure whites 
that their superior position is warranted rather than illegitimate. But it seems likely to also 
reflect a cognitive predisposition to greatly resent any effort to take away what we 
presently hold. Thus,” the study concluded, “even if gains from integration exceed the 
losses, the losses will be counted much more heavily in how whites experience them."148 
For other white voters, Wallace simply represented a return to the previous era’s 
acceptance of white supremacy and opposition to racial progress. An Italian American at 
a Madison Square Garden rally observed, “George Wallace sure told them Niggas a thing 
or two.” A cab driver from Baltimore applauded Wallace’s highly racialized tough-on-
crime posturing, declaring, “I like his stand on law and order. You know - The 
niggers.”149  
As the election approached, Nixon positioned himself between Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey’s reluctance to fully embrace law and order and the extremism of 
George Wallace’s zealous rants, emerging as a seemingly reasonable middle ground 
candidate between the nation’s polarizing and divergent political ideologies. In the 
months leading up the election, organized labor’s staunch support for Humphrey, as well 
as Wallace’s fanaticism, had damaged the Alabama governor’s standing in the polls. By 
late October, sixty-nine percent of those surveyed felt that he was a racial extremist, an 
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increase of eighteen percentage points. The number of those polled who felt that he 
would properly handle law and order fell from fifty-three to twenty-one percent.150  
While Wallace slipped in the polls, Nixon continued to run a deliberate but 
measured campaign, utilizing television ads that touched upon the law and order premises 
that had become the cornerstone of his campaign. One commercial announced, "Freedom 
from fear is a basic right of every American and we must restore it."151 His message 
tapped directly into the resentments and racial anxiety of middle-class America and 
played a prominent role in shaping public opinion in the months leading up the election. 
The G.O.P candidate had learned in the 1960 presidential debates the potency of 
television media and vowed this time to engage it in his favor. After viewing one of his 
campaign ads in 1968, Nixon remarked, "Yep, this hits it right on the nose...it's all about 
law and order and the damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there."152  
Future Fox News chairman Roger Ailes served as a media advisor to Nixon in the 
months leading up to the election. He counseled the candidate to bypass the left-leaning 
press, and instead, use the power of television to directly engage voters with a series of 
televised events. These staged town hall gatherings placed loyal G.O.P. party members in 
the audience. Ailes described those in attendance as an “applause machine” that lofted 
pre-selected questions at Nixon. As a counterbalance to a token black man who had been 
planted in a Philadelphia audience, Ailes proposed adding a, “good, mean Wallace cab 
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driver. Wouldn’t that be great? Some guy to sit there and say, 'Awright, Mac, what about 
these niggers?”153     
When confronted with suggestions that his calls for law and order were racially 
charged critiques of poor black communities, the future president took the advice offered 
by his speech writer Pat Buchanan. Nixon defended his campaign against claims of 
racializing his rhetoric to appeal to white voters, declaring that the charge was “reverse 
racism” because it, "implies that Negroes are opposed to law and order. This is an 
outrageous calumny and indeed two recent polls indicate clearly that crime is the major 
concern of Negroes in our largest cities.” He further deflected claims of race baiting 
declaring, “Law and order is not racism. Law and order with justice is what Negroes 
want, what they need, and they have an ever greater steak in it than do whites, because 
they are the main victims of disorder and illegal activities."154   
In the summer and autumn months leading up to the 1968 election, Nixon 
addressed middle-class white voters whom he termed the “Forgotten Americans” - the 
Silent Majority who, "did not indulge in violence, those who did not break the law, 
people who pay their taxes and go to work, people who send their children to school, who 
go to their churches, people who are not haters, people who love this country, and 
because they love this country are angry about what has happened to America.”155 It was 
among this increasingly anxious demographic that Nixon’s message found its greatest 
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resonance. The decade’s cascading turbulence had shifted the nation’s collective 
temperament and propelled Nixon to the Oval Office. He, like Reagan in 1966, would be 
the beneficiary of the era’s chaos and division.  
Nixon won the 1968 presidential election receiving 302 electoral votes to 
Humphrey’s 181 and Wallace’s forty-five.156 The liberal momentum born during the New 
Deal and emboldened by the decade’s early optimism and economic prosperity, had 
finally collapsed in a contentious battle of attrition. George Wallace’s relative success as 
an independent candidate revealed the potency of appealing to white America’s racial 
anxieties. He received sixteen percent of the vote in the Midwest while carrying five 
southern states and receiving nearly ten million popular votes.157 His success as “the most 
important loser in American politics” exposed white disenfranchisement with the 
decade’s turbulent changes.158 Wallace’s support and Nixon’s triumph underscored the 
degree to which a growing number of Americans had become disenchanted with the 
perceived failures of liberal government, the loss of law and order, an unpopular foreign 
war, and the decade’s volatile racial discord.  
Vice President Humphrey was unable to successfully refute Republican claims 
that the Johnson administration had facilitated the nation’s descent into cultural fracture 
and social unrest. The election was a referendum that firmly established a new precedent 
that would follow subsequent presidential candidates into the twenty first century. In 
order to gain access to the White House, presidential hopefuls would need to channel the 
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anxieties, insecurities, and frustrations of white America into cogent political capital. 
Failure to rally the support of these voters would mean almost certain defeat in 





President Richard Nixon’s first year in office marked both a literal and symbolic 
end to the 1960s. Noting the degree to which, by early 1969, the United States had 
divided against itself, the President acknowledged the nation’s “crisis of spirt” and 
“raucous discord.” From the inaugural podium he declared, "We cannot learn from one 
another until we stop shouting at one another."159 The decade’s disunion and turmoil 
would continue throughout the year as an exhausted nation continued to unravel. The 
horrors associated with My Lai, Kent State, and the Manson Family ushered out the 
decade as anti-war protests and racial unrest continued to divide the nation. As 
Americans took their first strides across the lunar surface in 1969, they looked back on a 
homeland forever changed by the painful conflicts that defined the era.     
As the turbulent 1960s came to a close, the United States began to confront new 
challenges that would remove racially coded provocations and law and order posturing 
from the forefront of the nation’s political discourse. Although tough on crime promises 
and white backlash did not disappear, the shifting political landscape did not lend itself as 
easily to the racially coded rhetoric employed by Goldwater, Wallace, and Nixon. In the 
1960s, the cauldron of racial tension, integration, urban riots, and student protest stirred 
the nation’s anxieties, leaving the white middle class vulnerable to calls for law and 
order. However, by the early 1970s these contentious issues began to fade from the 
headlines and were replaced by America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, Watergate, and a 
sharp economic decline.160  
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Nixon’s corruption scandal nullified the moral high ground of his law and order 
platform, while the liberal view that linked crime to poverty in the 1960s was abandoned 
by many on the Left as unsound. While the methodology that propelled the Southern 
Strategy in the 1960s was still evident in local political campaigns throughout the nation, 
its presence at the national level diminished amid the malaise of the 1970s. However, the 
election of the fortieth president in 1980 would restore racially coded appeals for states’ 
rights and limited government to the center of American political discourse.  
While campaigning in 1980, Ronald Reagan revised the Southern Strategy and 
applied it to emerging changes in the American cultural, economic, and political 
landscape.161 He rode to Pennsylvania Avenue with the support of powerful conservative 
think tanks and a reinvigorated Republican base. This New Right movement harnessed 
the electoral backing of Evangelical Christians and an increasingly conservative white 
middle class. Many of these voters carried racial resentments and frustrations from the 
sixties with them into the 1980s.  
With Reagan as the party’s charismatic figurehead, racially coded provocations 
were revived and once again brought to the forefront of the American political arena.162 
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Preying upon the flaccid leadership and economic travails of the 1970s, he would wean 
the nation away from the last vestiges of the New Deal and hasten blue collar America’s 
move toward modern conservatism. As he pushed the nation’s political center to the 
right, Reagan mobilized the racial anxieties and resentments of America’s white middle 
class, completing a process that had begun in the primary victories of Wallace and 
Goldwater two decades earlier. By the 1980s, the Southern Strategy had come full circle, 
facilitating the rise of a modern conservatism that would impact the American political 
landscape well into the twenty first century.163  
The racially coded language that anchored the political ambitions of Wallace, 
Goldwater, and Nixon in the 1960s has since echoed across the campaigns of Democrats 
and Republicans alike. George H. W. Bush mobilized white fear of black criminality by 
enacting Willie Horton, an African American convicted of rape and murder, as a political 
boogieman in order to portray his Democratic opponent Michael Dukakis as soft on 
crime. The controversial ploy helped sway voters against the Massachusetts Governor, 
allowing Bush to capture the Oval Office in 1988.164 Four years later while running as a 
Democratic Presidential candidate, Bill Clinton demonstrated to white middle class 
voters his willingness to get tough on crime by overseeing the execution of a mentally 
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disabled black man during his 1992 campaign.165 As President, Clinton ended “welfare as 
we know it,” signifying to Middle America an intolerance for those who abused public 
assistance. This measure, while outwardly race neutral, nodded to racial resentments 
regarding a social safety net which many white voters associated with African 
Americans. While in office, Clinton expanded Reagan’s drug war and enacted “three 
strikes” sentencing mandates which disproportionately impacted African American 
communities and greatly expanded the nation’s incarcerated population. These actions 
indicate that Clinton had learned from his Republican forbearers the necessity of 
channeling white America’s racial anxieties into electoral support.166  
The September 11 terrorist attacks recalibrated the worldview of America’s white 
middle class, providing the nation’s elected officials with new leverage from which to 
transfer racial trepidation into political capital. Critics of George W. Bush point to his 
administration’s channeling of post-9/11 racial animosity in order to advance a broad 
range of political initiatives, including the War on Terror and America’s 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. These voices express valid concerns although they are also compelled to 
acknowledge Bush’s public denouncement of anti-Muslim sentiment as well as his 
electoral support from Hispanic Americans in both 2000 and 2004.167 Similarly, 
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prominent liberal scholars including Michelle Alexander, Ian Haney Lopez, and Cornell 
West find considerable fault in President Obama’s failure to enact more impactful racial 
reforms. They view his acknowledgement of the social problems associated with absent 
black fathers, deportation of undocumented immigrants, failure to end the Drug War, as 
well as his hardline stance on child rapists, as evidence of his capacity to pander to white 
voters.168 Prominent black academics continue to criticize Obama’s handling of a myriad 
of race related issues ranging from “Gates-Gate” to housing, unemployment, and 
education. Collectively, they contend that his tepid response to these issues stems from an 
unwillingness to alienate white voters. However, my analysis contends that both Bush 
and Obama, when compared to the political actors profiled in this study, employed 
relative restraint in their appeals to white racial anxieties.    
However, as President Obama prepared to leave office, the populist rise of Donald 
Trump once again brought the resentments of the nation’s white middle class to the 
forefront of the American political arena. The country’s changing racial demographics, 
new fears regarding terrorism and immigration, as well America’s place in the global 
economy, have left many whites displaced and alienated. Just as the social turbulence of 
the 1960s drew this vulnerable population away from Lyndon Johnson’s liberal reforms, 
the racial anxieties and resentments inherent in the twenty first century political 
landscape have again inspired a conservative backlash. Trump’s campaign promises and 
“America First” platform made little attempt to veil a contempt for the nation’s 
progressive domestic advancements or the United States’ role in an increasingly 
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globalized world. His message was welcomed by the white middle class voters who 
found in his language an acknowledgement of their displacement, racial fears, and 
unspoken resentments.169    
As the nation again finds itself divided along ever widening ideological, racial, 
and economic lines, echoes of the 1960s ring throughout contemporary America’s social 
and political landscape. This disunity is not entirely new or unprecedented. Instead, it 
represents the most recent release of white America’s smoldering racial resentments and 
broader social frustrations. These festering sentiments came to a rolling boil throughout 
the Obama presidency as liberal momentum and social change again challenged critical 
precepts of the nation’s long standing status quo. For many among the country’s white 
middle class, Trump’s provocations offered a restoration of the national character and a 
reprieve from the literal and symbolic changes put forth by America’s first black 
president.   
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